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FOIA, INC. 
MARGARET B. KWOKA† 
ABSTRACT 
  Government transparency is imagined as a public good necessary 
to a robust democracy. Consistent with that vision, Congress enacted 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to allow oversight and 
accountability of governmental activities, imagining the prime 
intended users to be journalists. But this democracy-enhancing ideal is 
at odds with FOIA’s reality: at some agencies, commercial—not 
public—interests dominate the landscape of FOIA requesters. 
  This Article provides the first in-depth academic study of the 
commercial use of FOIA, drawing on original datasets from six 
federal agencies. It documents how corporations, in pursuit of private 
profit, have overrun FOIA’s supremely inexpensive processes and, in 
so doing, potentially crowded out journalists and other government 
watchdogs from doing what the law was intended to facilitate: third-
party oversight of governmental actors. It also reveals a cottage 
industry of companies whose entire business model is to request 
federal records under FOIA and resell them at a profit, which distorts 
the transparency system even further. 
  Counterintuitively, limiting commercial requesting will not solve 
this problem. Instead, this Article proposes a targeted and aggressive 
policy of requiring government agencies to affirmatively disclose sets 
of records that are the subject of routine FOIA requests—a 
surprisingly large number of the documents sought by commercial 
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requesters. By meeting information needs in a more efficient manner 
that is available equally to all, affirmative disclosure will enable 
federal agencies to reclaim public records from the private market and 
free up resources to better serve FOIA requests that advance its 
democratic purpose. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Having witnessed adverse reactions in patients, a prominent 
physician repeatedly emailed various Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) officials to sound an alarm about a dangerous dietary 
supplement on the market.1 The FDA did not respond for six months, 
at which point it issued a public health alert and requested that the 
manufacturer recall the product.2 When the New York Times 
investigated why the agency had such a delayed response to a serious 
public health threat, the paper filed a Freedom of Information Act 
 
 1. Anahad O’Connor, Study Warns of Diet Supplement Dangers Kept Quiet by F.D.A., 
N.Y. TIMES: WELL (Apr. 7 2015, 9:43 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/study-
warns-of-diet-supplement-dangers-kept-quiet-by-f-d-a [http://perma.cc/ZX39-3G9Y]. 
 2. Id. 
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(FOIA)3 request for the communications between the doctor and the 
FDA.4 The response: the FDA was “unable to locate” any of the 
records.5 
The FDA is not alone in having trouble responding to 
journalists’ FOIA requests. The Department of Defense’s Inspector 
General issued a report detailing the misconduct of the Director of 
the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, who had improperly given 
preferential treatment to a subordinate with whom he had a special 
relationship, improperly required his subordinates to perform 
personal tasks for him, and improperly allowed a family member to 
use the agency’s firing range.6 When a Washington Post journalist 
learned of the investigation and wanted to report on this instance of 
government malfeasance, he filed a FOIA request.7 It took the agency 
seven months to produce the forty-page report.8 
In both examples, which are hardly unique, journalists sought to 
use FOIA as it was intended, to protect the public’s right to know 
“what [its] government is up to.”9 In fact, no law is more centrally 
intended to promote transparency as a means of democratic 
governance than FOIA.10 Nonetheless, FOIA has been rightly 
critiqued for failing to live up to its promise, hindered by 
 
 3. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT NO. 20121204-000911, ALLEGED 
MISCONDUCT: MR. STEPHEN E. CALVERY, SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE, DIRECTOR, 
PENTAGON FORCE PROTECTION AGENCY 1–2 (2013), http://www.dodig.mil/FOIA/err/Calvery
ROI%28Redacted%29.pdf [http://perma.cc/WUV6-NFWL]. 
 7. Craig Whitlock, Bad Boss at Pentagon was ‘Misusing’ Underlings, Report Says, WASH. 
POST: IN THE LOOP (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/2013/
11/04/bad-boss-at-pentagon-misused-underlings-report-says [http://perma.cc/N7AY-5FGC]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 
(1989) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973)). 
 10. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
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administrative inefficiency,11 overwithholding of information,12 and 
courts’ failure to act as a meaningful check on agency secrecy.13 
One failing, however, is particularly notable: FOIA’s failure to 
meet the news media’s information needs, as exemplified above. 
Journalists were at the heart of the purpose of creating a statutory 
right to access government information; it was thought that the news 
media would inform the public about government operations, thereby 
facilitating democratic participation and exposing potential 
government corruption or malfeasance.14 Not only was the news 
media a specially contemplated user of FOIA, but journalists were 
actually integrally involved in crafting the law.15 Yet, news agencies 
and reporters have lamented FOIA’s many failures, most importantly 
the delay in receiving records that often renders them obsolete.16 
Despite these many critiques, however, FOIA remains in high 
demand. During each of the last two reported fiscal years, federal 
government agencies received over 700,000 requests.17 The public’s 
interest in government information appears, therefore, still to be 
strong. But if FOIA is not primarily serving the newsgathering, 
democracy-enhancing function of informing public debate on matters 
of governmental policy, what interests, then, does it primarily serve? 
Relying on records logging select federal agencies’ FOIA 
requests (themselves obtained through dozens of FOIA requests), 
this Article explains how corporations have distorted the principal 
government-transparency law’s operation. To that end, the Article 
proceeds in four Parts. Part I explores FOIA as it was originally 
 
 11. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, 
REGULATION, Mar.–Apr. 1982, at 14, 15 (calling FOIA “the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of 
Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis Ignored”). 
 12. See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, STATEMENT OF ADINA ROSENBAUM ON ADMINISTRATION OF 
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 5–6 (Mar. 18, 2010), https://www.citizen.org/
documents/AdinaTestimony.pdf [http://perma.cc/QHJ3-3W4R] (documenting instances of 
overwithholding). 
 13. See, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 213 (2013) 
(arguing that despite the formal de novo review standard mandated in the statute, courts give 
substantial and sometimes conclusive deference to agency decisions to withhold documents).  
 14. See infra Part I.A. 
 15. See infra Part I.A. 
 16. For a more detailed accounting of the reasons why the press finds FOIA fails to meet 
their needs, see infra Part I.B.  
 17. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
2014, at 2 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/pages/attachments/2015/05/01/fy_
2014_annual_report_summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/SAT-KKKY] [hereinafter DOJ, FY 2014 
SUMMARY] (documenting 704,394 requests in FY 2013 and 714,231 in FY 2014). 
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conceived. It documents the democracy-enhancing purposes of the 
law, the unique role the news media was imagined to play in 
facilitating that goal, and the eventual failure of the law to serve the 
news media’s information needs. 
Part II delves deeply into how businesses, rather than the news 
media, are using FOIA. Drawing on original data obtained from six 
federal agencies, it first documents the extent to which commercial 
requesters—private entities that seek information as part of their 
profit-making enterprise—dominate the landscape at some agencies. 
Then, and perhaps most importantly, it explores the kinds of 
information businesses seek and exactly how some of the most 
frequent commercial requesters are actually using the records they 
obtain. This Part demonstrates that, across a variety of contexts, some 
of the highest-volume commercial requesters are essentially 
information-reselling businesses whose profit model depends on 
obtaining government records at low cost and reselling them, for a 
higher price, to interested parties. It further shows that the vast 
majority of all commercial FOIA requests are seeking the same types 
of routine records. 
Part III uses these insights to describe the consequences of 
commercial FOIA practices, generally demonstrating a privatization 
of information access. It contends that FOIA’s fee structure 
essentially subsidizes commercial requesters’ access to records and 
does so in a way that is highly unlikely to provide the kind of public 
benefit that justifies the existence of subsidies. It also argues that the 
volume of commercial requesters creates resource scarcity in FOIA 
offices, which is likely to negatively affect the quality and speed of 
responses to other requesters, including the news media. Finally, it 
problematizes the role of private businesses as information 
intermediaries that resell government records, likening the practice to 
de facto outsourcing of an inherently public function. 
Contrary to any implication that business interests should be 
disallowed or disfavored in FOIA administration, Part IV suggests 
that increased affirmative disclosure by government agencies best 
returns FOIA to its original democratic purpose. Agencies have the 
power to identify those records that businesses are routinely using for 
private profit and to eliminate the profit-making potential by 
themselves publishing databases that are easily accessible, searchable, 
and downloadable. Raw reselling of this information would no longer 
be a profitable venture, and agencies would no longer have to 
respond to thousands of FOIA requests for the same types of records 
KWOKA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2016  12:45 AM 
1366 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1361 
on a one-by-one basis. Aside from potential cost savings to the 
agency, secondary benefits are substantial. By removing high cost 
barriers set up by information resellers in the private market, small 
businesses would no longer be at a disadvantage in accessing 
information. In the public domain, affirmative disclosure would free 
up agencies’ FOIA resources to serve citizens and news-media 
information requests, perhaps reducing the barriers to FOIA’s 
effectiveness in facilitating democratic accountability. 
I.  FAILING THE FOURTH ESTATE18 
The press has, of course, a revered place in United States history, 
meriting direct constitutional protection in the First Amendment.19 In 
fact, the press is viewed as vital to our democracy.20 Access to 
government information, however, is relatively new.21 This part 
demonstrates the integral role the press played in crafting the law, the 
centrality of the press in Congress’s vision of FOIA’s intended users, 
and the failure of that vision to come to fruition. 
 
 18. The “Fourth Estate” refers to the press. Attribution for this designation is generally 
given to Edmund Burke, as described in Jeffrey Archer’s novel, The Fourth Estate: 
In May 1789, Louis XVI summoned to Versailles a full meeting of the ‘Estates 
General.’ 
  The First Estate consisted of three hundred nobles. 
  The Second Estate, three hundred clergy. 
  The Third Estate, six hundred commoners. 
Some years later, after the French Revolution, Edmund Burke, looking up at the 
Press Gallery of the House of Commons, said, “Yonder sits the Fourth Estate, and 
they are more important than them all.”  
JEFFREY ARCHER, THE FOURTH ESTATE 1 (1996). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a 
redress of grievances.”). 
 20. See WHAT GOOD IS JOURNALISM?: HOW REPORTERS AND EDITORS ARE SAVING 
AMERICA’S WAY OF LIFE 1 (George Kennedy & Daryl Moen eds., 2007) (describing the 
purpose of the book as to show “the most important roles that journalism, with all its well-
documented faults, plays in the world’s oldest democracy”). 
 21. FOIA was enacted in 1966. Statement by the President upon Signing the “Freedom of 
Information Act,” in 2 PUB. PAPERS 699 (July 4, 1966). 
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A. The Goal of Freedom of Information 
Government transparency is such a lofty and laudable goal that it 
has become the sort of rallying cry one can hardly be against.22 
Difficult as it would have been to imagine at the time of FOIA’s 
enactment, the right of the public to access government information 
has arguably risen beyond a statutory right,23 or even arguments for a 
constitutional right,24 but indeed has been declared a human right.25 
Domestic laws have been adopted in at least one hundred countries,26 
and movements are afoot in even seemingly unlikely places such as 
South Sudan27 and Afghanistan.28 
The United States, however, led the modern movement in favor 
of transparency laws. In 1966, when it enacted FOIA, the United 
States was only the second country to have a freedom of information 
regime.29 As a brand-new statutory right, the purpose of guaranteeing 
 
 22. See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 888 (2006) 
(declaring transparency, vaguely defined, to be “clearly among the pantheon of great political 
virtues”). 
 23. In the United States, a collection of statutes provides rights of access to the federal 
government, including FOIA, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. app. 
§§ 1–16 (2012), and the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012). At the state 
level, analogs in the form of open records and open meetings laws abound. See, e.g., California 
Public Records Act, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 6250–6268 (2015); Colorado Open Records Act, COLO. 
REV. STAT. §§ 24-72-201 to -309 (2015); New York Freedom of Information Law, N.Y. PUB. 
OFF. LAW §§ 84–90 (2015); see also State Freedom of Information Laws, NAT’L FREEDOM OF 
INFO. COALITION, http://www.nfoic.org/state-freedom-of-information-laws [http://perma.cc/
69KM-VRKN] (compiling information regarding state information-freedom laws). 
 24. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, The First Amendment and the Right to Know: Legal 
Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 14 (1976) (arguing for a constitutional 
basis rooted in the First Amendment for the public’s right to access government information).  
 25. In 2006, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights declared access to government 
information to be included within the basic human right of free thought and expression. Reyes 
v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 77 (Sept. 19, 2006). The European Court of 
Human Rights did the same in 2009. See Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, App. No. 
37374/05, ¶ 39 (Apr. 14, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-92171 [http://perma.cc/3PS7-
DESA]. 
 26. Chronological and Alphabetical List of Countries with FOI Regimes, 
FREEDOMINFO.ORG, http://www.freedominfo.org/chronological-and-alphabetical-lists-of-
countries-with-foi-regimes [http://perma.cc/LBF9-PQGL]. 
 27. South Sudan Approved Right to Information Law in 2013, FREEDOMINFO.ORG (Dec. 
17, 2014), http://www.freedominfo.org/2014/12/south-sudan-approved-right-information-law-
2013 [http://perma.cc/L9U3-KETP]. 
 28. Afghan President Signs Access to Information Law, FREEDOMINFO.ORG (Dec. 9, 2014), 
http://www.freedominfo.org/2014/12/afghan-president-signs-access-information-law [http://
perma.cc/SK26-CN5Z]. 
 29. See FOI Regimes, What’s New, FREEDOMINFO.ORG, http://www.freedominfo.org/
regions/global/foi-regimes [http://perma.cc/N4K2-R8HE] (follow “FOI Countries by Date” 
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the public’s access to government information should be gleaned 
from Congress itself. The House of Representatives Report broadly 
declared, “A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent 
electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity 
and quality of its information varies.”30 The Senate Report similarly 
explained that “[a]lthough the theory of an informed electorate is so 
vital to the proper operation of a democracy, there is nowhere in our 
present law a statute which affirmatively provides for a policy of 
disclosure.”31 It further explained that a central purpose of FOIA was 
to “provide a court procedure by which citizens and the press may 
obtain information wrongfully withheld.”32 
Indeed, Congress’s declarations as to the purpose of enacting 
freedom-of-information legislation tightly align with two of the most 
influential theories concerning the role of free speech in a system of 
democratic governance, both of which directly implicate the need for 
public access to government information.33 The work of Alexander 
Meiklejohn conceptualizes free speech as necessary to democracy so 
that the electorate may be sufficiently informed to participate in its 
own governance.34 Distinctly, but relatedly, the work of Vincent Blasi 
asserts the value of free speech in checking government abuse.35 Both 
theories, importantly, are instrumental: the right to access 
government information is merely a tool to improve democratic 
governance. And the Supreme Court has affirmed this view of 
 
hyperlink for a dowloadable document listing FOI regime enactment). The first was Sweden, 
which has had an FOI regime since 1766, exactly two hundred years prior to the enactment of 
the US FOIA. Id. 
 30. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 12 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2429. 
 31. S. REP. NO. 88-1219, at 8 (1964).  
 32. Id. at 8. 
 33. Heidi Kitrosser nicely describes these two theories as they relate to FOI laws in Secrecy 
in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative 
State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 126–30 (2004); see also Michael Doyle, The Freedom of 
Information Act In Theory and Practice (May 2001) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Johns Hopkins 
University) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (articulating these two as the “most common 
theories . . . undergirding information access,” but adding a third suggested theory centering on 
public ownership claims on government information). 
 34. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 63 (1948) (“[The First Amendment] stands alone, as the cornerstone of the 
structure of self-government. If that uniqueness were taken away, government by consent of the 
governed would have perished from the earth.”). 
 35. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 3 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 521, 527 (1977) (contending that “the First Amendment has had at least as much impact 
on American life by facilitating a process by which countervailing forces check the misuse of 
official power” as by protecting various individual rights). 
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FOIA’s role: “The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed 
citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to 
check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the 
governed.”36 
In considering this ultimate goal, no one’s interests were more 
contemplated than the news media’s. In fact, it was largely the news 
media’s clamoring that brought about congressional action in the first 
place. Professor Mark Fenster has carefully documented the history 
of the movement that led to the passage of FOIA, demonstrating its 
origins with the press.37 Fenster describes how a combination of 
American wire services’ defeat of the early-twentieth-century 
European cartel of news organizations closely tied to particular 
governments and the Cold War narrative around free press as an 
American democratic ideal created a strong sense of journalists’ 
professional identity and values around objective independent 
reporting.38 Kent Cooper, the general manager of the Associated 
Press (AP), which, under his leadership, was most responsible for 
defeating the European news cartel,39 authored an article published in 
Life Magazine in 1945 entitled “Freedom of Information,” in which 
he advocated for a broader understanding of freedom of the press 
that includes the freedom to “seek out news.”40 Cooper not only 
believed in a right of the public to access information, but also, as 
demonstrated in his 1956 book, The Right to Know,41 viewed the 
press’s role as central: the news media was ethically bound to present 
information to the public to allow for informed political 
participation.42 
Around the same time, the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors (ASNE), the most prominent organization representing 
journalists’ interests, formed a “Freedom of Information 
Committee.”43 Initially the Committee focused on international press 
 
 36. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (citations omitted).  
 37. Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Their Alternatives in 
the Pursuit of a Visible State, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 443, 451–66 (2012). 
 38. Id. at 452–57. 
 39. Id. at 453. 
 40. Kent Cooper, Freedom of Information: Head of Associated Press Calls for Unhampered 
Flow of World News, LIFE MAG. (Nov. 13, 1944), at 55, 55. 
 41. KENT COOPER, THE RIGHT TO KNOW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE EVILS OF NEWS 
SUPPRESSION AND PROPAGANDA (1956). 
 42. Fenster, supra note 37, at 458. 
 43. Id. at 461. 
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freedoms, but it quickly shifted its efforts to the United States, in 
particular to U.S. government secrecy.44 The committee recruited 
Harold Cross as its legal advisor in its various fights for access to 
information,45 and in that role he authored the 1953 book, The 
People’s Right to Know,46 in which he reported on the state of 
information access, describing an inconsistent and hard-to-discern 
patchwork of potential rights to government information.47 In the 
book, Cross called on Congress to “legislate freedom of information 
for itself, the public, and the press,” as a national remedy to the 
current unsatisfactory state of affairs.48 
Shortly after Cross’s book was published, President Eisenhower, 
responding to the Cold War, set up an office designed to procure 
voluntary cooperation from industry and the press in not publishing 
so-called “strategic information” that might help U.S. enemies.49 A 
year later, the Department of Defense issued a memo to government 
officials and contractors requiring any release of information to not 
only be benign, but in fact to make a “constructive contribution” to 
defense efforts.50 These secrecy measures prompted some degree of 
outrage in the public and the press.51 
A relatively junior Congressman, Representative John Moss, 
responded by successfully urging leadership to create a Special 
Subcommittee on Government Information within the Government 
Operations Committee on which Moss served, and to name him as 
the subcommittee’s chair.52 Using Cross’s book as a call to action, the 
ASNE Freedom of Information Committee connected the author 
with Chairman Moss; Cross became the subcommittee’s legal advisor, 
while journalists made up the bulk of its staff.53 In fact, the 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. James S. Pope, Foreword to HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW: 
LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS, at viii (1953). 
 47. See CROSS, supra note 46, at 19–37 (describing statutes, judicial decisions, regulations, 
and opinions of attorneys general as the various sources from which a right to know had in some 
circumstances arisen). 
 48. Id. at 246. 
 49. MICHAEL R. LEMOV, PEOPLE’S WARRIOR: JOHN MOSS AND THE FIGHT FOR 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND CONSUMER RIGHTS 49 (2011).  
 50. Id. at 49–50. 
 51. Id. at 50. 
 52. Id. at 50–51. 
 53. Fenster, supra note 37, at 464; see also Sam Archibald, The Early Years of the Freedom 
of Information Act—1955 to 1974, 26 POL. SCI. & POL. 726, 727 (1993) (“The newspaper-
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subcommittee deployed those journalists on a decade-long campaign 
to investigate the problem of government secrecy.54 
As work progressed, Moss routinely called journalists to testify 
before the subcommittee in an attempt both to document the extent 
of the information-access problem and to gain attention for the 
cause.55 Between 1955 and 1960, the subcommittee collected 176 
complaints about unjustified government secrecy, of which 37 percent 
were from journalists and 45 percent from Congress itself, suggesting 
an outsized role for journalists in using any new freedom of 
information law.56 Journalists were also key in beating back attempts 
to defund or abolish the subcommittee.57 After more than a decade of 
effort, the 1966 Freedom of Information Act, as enacted, in fact fully 
embraced Cross’s proposal for a statutory right of the people in a 
single legislative solution.58 
In this victory, the news media’s role was hardly hidden from 
public view. Moss himself said on the floor when FOIA was passed, 
“The list of editors, broadcasters and newsmen and distinguished 
members of the corps who have helped develop the legislation over 
these 10 years is endless,” and he went on to specially thank 
journalists at many major news outlets, as well as the ASNE, the 
American Newspaper Publishers Association, and the National 
Newspaper Association.59 One Congressman noted not only the news 
media’s crucial role in devising FOIA, but its ongoing imperative to 
use the law: “[I]t will take vigorous action by the . . . Nation’s press to 
make our objectives [in passing FOIA] a reality.”60  
FOIA was thus designed largely by journalists, for journalists, 
and with the particular goal in mind that journalists would use access 
to government information to provide knowledge to the public, which 
would, in turn, facilitate the public’s effective participation in 
democratic governance. 
 
reporter staff members [of the Moss committee] had collected information [about government 
secrecy] by investigation, interview and research, then reported the results in clear language, 
just as they had done while writing for newspapers.”). 
 54. Archibald, supra note 53, at 728. 
 55. See LEMOV, supra note 49, at 56–57 (describing Moss’s strategy of “demonstrating a 
pervasive problem and then calling on the government . . . to explain why the problem should 
not be fixed”).  
 56. Doyle, supra note 33, at 33–34.  
 57. LEMOV, supra note 49, at 60.  
 58. Fenster, supra note 37, at 465. 
 59. 112 CONG. REC. 13,642–43 (1966). 
 60. Id. at 13,655 (statement of Rep. Hall). 
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B. Effective Requesting 
Given FOIA’s relatively distinct and narrow goal—facilitation of 
effective and informed democratic participation61—its provisions are 
startlingly broad. Its signature provision requires each agency, upon 
receiving a request for records, to “make the records promptly 
available to any person,” who need only “reasonably describe [the 
requested] records” and follow the agency’s published rules for 
submitting requests.62 In turn, a “person” for purposes of the statute, 
“includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or 
public or private organization other than an agency.”63 Thus, the right 
of access is broadly conceived. 
In fact, the statute’s fee structure, added in a 1986 amendment, 
specifically contemplates a variety of users.64 For commercial-use 
requests, agencies can charge fees for “reasonable standard charges 
for document search, duplication, and review,”65 whereas if a “request 
is made by an educational or noncommercial scientific institution, 
whose purpose is scholarly or scientific research; or a representative 
of the news media,” fees are limited to duplication charges alone.66 
And for all other requesters, fees are limited to charges for search 
and duplication.67 For all types of fees, agencies can only charge for 
their “direct costs,”68 which means “those expenditures which an 
agency actually incurs in searching for and duplicating (and in the 
case of commercial requesters, reviewing) documents to respond to a 
 
 61. See supra Part I.A. 
 62. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012).  
 63. Id. § 551(2).  
 64. 132 CONG. REC. S14,297–98. 
 65. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I). 
 66. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II). A “representative of the news media” for the purposes of 
FOIA is “any person or entity that gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the 
public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that 
work to an audience,” while “news” is defined as “information that is about current events or 
that would be of current interest to the public.” Id. 
 67. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(III). In addition to the three categories, any requester may ask 
for a waiver of otherwise applicable fees if the request is “in the public interest because it is 
likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the 
government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.” Id. 
§ 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). Because commercial-use requests are essentially disqualified from this fee-
waiver provision, the fee-waiver provision has negligible, if any, impact on the commercial use 
of FOIA, described infra Part II. 
 68. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv). 
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FOIA request.”69 Other than differential fees charged, however, there 
are no limits to access based on the identity of the requester or the 
purpose of the request.70 
Moreover, agencies may only withhold records that fall within 
one of nine statutory exemptions, which include protections for 
classified material, material that would invade personal privacy, 
certain law enforcement records, and privileged material, among 
others.71 Any person denied access to requested information has the 
right, under the statute, to first appeal the decision within the agency, 
and then, if still denied, to file a lawsuit in which a federal court 
reviews the agency’s decision de novo.72 In essence, FOIA was 
designed to simply open the doors of government agencies and allow 
the public a front seat view of what is inside. 
Contrary to the intent of Congress and widespread expectations 
at the time FOIA was passed, the news media has failed to find FOIA 
the great government-transparency tool it was promised to be, and, in 
fact, constitutes a tiny fraction of FOIA users. One 2006 study, which 
looked at one month’s worth of FOIA logs from eleven cabinet-level 
departments and six large agencies, found that only 6 percent of 
FOIA requests were submitted by journalists.73 Members of the news 
media also represent a tiny—and declining—proportion of the 
 
 69. The Freedom of Information Act; Uniform Freedom of Information Act Fee Schedule 
and Guidelines, 53 Fed. Reg. 10,012, 10,017 (Mar. 27, 1967). These costs include the salary of 
the employee plus a percentage of that salary for benefits and the cost of operating a photocopy 
machine, but not overhead such as heating or lighting in the building. Id. 
 70. For an analysis of whether motive should be taken into account, see generally James T. 
O’Reilly, “Access to Records” Versus “Access to Evil”: Should Disclosure Laws Consider 
Motives as a Barrier to Records Release?, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559 (2003).  
 71. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9). The full range of exemptions applies to records that are 
properly classified for national-security reasons, are related only to internal personnel rules and 
practices, are specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute, are trade secrets or 
confidential commercial or financial information, would be privileged in ordinary litigation, 
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy if released, are certain types 
of records compiled for law enforcement purposes, are related to reports of examinations of 
financial institutions, or are certain types of geological records concerning wells. Id.  
 72. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B), (6)(A). For a critique of courts’ application of the de novo standard 
in the FOIA context, see Kwoka, supra note 13, at 197–98. If a requester wants to challenge the 
agency’s decision as to the requester’s fee category (commercial, news, or other), a requester 
can also administratively appeal that determination and seek judicial review. See, e.g., Elec. 
Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Def., 241 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2003).  
 73. Frequent Filers: Businesses Make FOIA Their Business, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS 
(July 3, 2006), http://www.spj.org/rrr.asp?ref=31&t=foia [http://perma.cc/BFD9-VZ2L]. 
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requesters who file lawsuits to challenge FOIA denials, ranging 
between 1 and 2 percent of all FOIA plaintiffs.74 
One former president of the Society of Professional Journalists 
wrote, “From the outset, the FOIA was considered a journalist’s tool, 
but journalists never have made up more than a fraction of the 
requesters. Most journalists either malign or ignore it. That lack of 
respect and recognition bewilders veteran FOIA advocates.”75 Mark 
Feldstein, an award winning investigative journalist formerly at CNN 
and ABC, explained the sources of frustration for reporters: 
I found FOIA to be occasionally, but not frequently useful, when I 
was an investigative reporter. It was not terribly useful for the vast 
majority of stories for obvious reasons: There are many exemptions 
in the law that allow agencies to avoid turning over information, and 
it can be a slow process under tight news deadlines, especially if you 
have to file an appeal. That said, I got lucky, either based on a tip 
that helped me narrow the focus of my request or just by happening 
to fish in the right waters. The FOIA law is great on paper, but in 
reality, it has many loopholes. Here’s the bottom line: FOIA is a 
crude tool. Don’t expect too much. It’s worth doing, but don’t 
expect too much and hold your breath waiting, because it can be a 
while.76 
Delay is one of the biggest problems cited by the media,77 and it 
is indeed a very real problem. The AP’s Gary Pruitt recently 
recounted how, after Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 went missing, the 
AP filed a FOIA request regarding the U.S. efforts to help locate the 
plane.78 Despite a twenty-business-day statutory deadline for a 
 
 74. Media Making Fewer Challenges to Government Secrecy in Federal Court, THE FOIA 
PROJECT (Mar. 14, 2013), http://foiaproject.org/2013/03/14/media-making-fewer-challenges-to-
government-secrecy-in-federal-court [http://perma.cc/7QDQ-YJ5N]. It is, of course, entirely 
possible that the declining rate of news media requesting is also in part due to the diminishing 
resources of the industry as a whole.  
 75. Paul McMasters, FOIA: It’s Always There, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS, http://www.spj.
org/foiabout.asp [http://perma.cc/JG8Z-BC3W].  
 76. Stephanie Martinez, The Good, the Bad, the Ugly of Using FOIA, AM. JOURNALISM 
REV. (Oct. 8, 2014), http://ajr.org/2014/10/08/foia-request-challenges [http://perma.cc/ET6Q-PM
W7] (quoting Mark Feldstein in an interview about FOIA use). 
 77. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, Missed Information: The Reporting Tool That Reporters Don’t 
Use, WASH. MONTHLY, May 2000, at 38, 40 (“Part of the reason that journalists so rarely use 
FOIA is that agencies can take so long in responding that the information often seems stale by 
the time it arrives.”); SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS, supra note 73. 
 78. Gary Pruitt, Public’s Access to Government Records Faces Roadblocks Aplenty, 
MCCLATCHYDC: OPINION (Mar. 13, 2015, 9:51 AM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/opinion/
article24781402.html [http://perma.cc/KL7F-BDC3]. 
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response,79 the only response the AP ever received—a full year 
later—was a notice that the agency has too many requests to meet the 
deadline.80 Another AP request to the Treasury Department 
remained unfilled for nine full years.81 The AP is hardly alone. The 
average processing time across the entire federal government for 
complex FOIA requests is a staggering 118 days.82 Even for simple 
requests, the average across the government slightly exceeds the 
deadline,83 and some agencies, of course, take much longer.84 At the 
end of FY 2014, the oldest pending requests across the federal 
government dated back to 1993.85 
To be sure, FOIA still serves important purposes for the news 
media. Even if the numbers are small, those individual requests may 
contribute greatly to the public’s understanding of certain 
government activities.86 Moreover, reporting routinely relies on 
information that advocacy groups may have pried loose under FOIA 
and passed along to journalists.87 For example, one researcher found 
that some of the most effective requesters in the area of the so-called 
“War on Terror” were well-financed nonprofits such as the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).88 And in any case, FOIA’s existence 
 
 79. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (2012). 
 80. Pruitt, supra note 78. 
 81. Id.  
 82. DOJ, FY 2014 SUMMARY, supra note 17, at 14. 
 83. Id. at 12. 
 84. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development, though improving over 
its prior record, still takes an average of 28.48 days to respond to a simple request. Id. at 13. 
 85. Id. at 11. 
 86. Indeed, some journalists are still effectively using FOIA. See, e.g., Ravi Somaiya, A 
Wizard at Prying Government Secrets From the Government, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/20/business/a-wizard-at-prying-government-secrets-from-the-
government.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/2HWT-J88Y] (describing journalist Jason Leopold’s 
successful use of FOIA); On The Line: Jason Leopold Discusses Uncovering Government 
Secrets, VICE NEWS (Apr. 6, 2015, 10:30 AM), https://news.vice.com/video/on-the-line-jason-
leopold-discusses-uncovering-government-secrets?utm_source=vicenewsyoutube&utm_
medium=video&utm_campaign=relatedvideo [http://perma.cc/H9CA-LD29] (documenting 
examples of the same). 
 87. Doyle, supra note 77, at 38. 
 88. Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1024 (2008). The full list of “most effective requesters” identified by 
Kreimer includes such advocacy groups as the National Security Archives, the ACLU, the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Center for 
Constitutional Rights, Judicial Watch, and the Center for National Security Studies. Id.  
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may make agencies more likely to release information publicly, 
knowing it would be required to upon request.89 
Still, the difficulties encountered by the news media demonstrate 
some of the prerequisites to effectively make use of FOIA. For 
instance, the requester has to have time to wait for what may be a 
much-delayed response.90 The requester also has to have some degree 
of specialized knowledge about the agency and the industry it 
regulates sufficient to know what to ask for.91 Expertise in FOIA 
requesting and in dealing with the agency, and the resources to 
devote to negotiating and potentially challenging denials are also 
assets in making use of FOIA.92 
Enter commercial requesters. The term “commercial use” in the 
fee provisions of FOIA has been interpreted by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to mean any “use that furthers the 
commercial, trade or profit interests of the requester or person on 
whose behalf the request is made.”93 And as it turns out, businesses 
which use FOIA to further profit interests often meet all of the 
qualifications for effective requesters: they often have interests that 
are more long-term, not immediate in nature; they have resources; 
and they know enough about what they are looking for to effectively 
seek the information under FOIA. 
Although a completely comprehensive study of who uses FOIA 
across the federal government and for what purposes has never been 
conducted, various samplings of FOIA requests over time have 
consistently identified businesses as prominent FOIA users. In 1972, 
the Congressional Research Service surveyed a sample of 
approximately 1500 requests over four years and concluded that 43 
percent were submitted by commercial businesses or law firms.94 In 
 
 89. McMasters, supra note 75. McMasters quotes Jane Kirley of the Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press as saying,  
Even when journalists don’t use the FOIA, it works for them . . . . This law creates a 
legal presumption of openness and accountability. Given how much of a struggle it is 
to get access with the law in place, I can’t imagine what it would be like if we didn’t 
have that kind of legislative mandate. 
Id. 
 90. See Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in 
the United States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 89–90 (2012). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986; Uniform Freedom of Information 
Act Fee Schedule and Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 10,012, 10,017–18 (Mar. 27, 1987). 
 94. Doyle, supra note 33, at 46, 66. 
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1978, the General Accounting Office boldly asserted that FOIA “is 
being used mostly by businesses and law firms—sometimes for 
purposes not contemplated by the Congress,” and found that those 
interests made up 58 percent of requests at agencies reviewed.95 More 
recently, in 2000, journalist Michael Doyle collected data from eleven 
federal agencies, and concluded that, across agencies, commercial 
requesters were often the largest in number.96 In a final snapshot, 
using 2005 data, the (now-disbanded) Coalition of Journalists for 
Open Government found that, across seventeen agencies, about two-
thirds of requests were commercial.97 
Media reports have also noted the strong presence of commercial 
interests among requesters. In 1996, the Wall Street Journal reported 
that “early on, it was discovered that FOIA was a handy tool for 
companies” and that there is evidence that FOIA is predominately 
used to serve business interests.98 In 2013, the Journal again addressed 
the issue, specifically reporting on the use of FOIA by hedge funds 
and finding that “investors use the process to troll for all kinds of 
information.”99 Recently, McClatchy DC reported that “corporate 
interests now drive the release of information” and that, as a result, 
 
 95. COMPTROLLER GEN., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LCD-78-120, GOVERNMENT FIELD 
OFFICES SHOULD BETTER IMPLEMENT THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, at ii (1978). The 
General Accounting Office (GAO) also noted the “prevalent complaint” among agency 
officials that “businesses and law firms . . . are profiting at taxpayers’ expense” in using FOIA. 
Id. at 36. GAO noted, however, that its review of the makeup of requesters was “hindered by a 
lack of pertinent agency records.” Id. The total number of requests studied was 2515. Id. at 37.  
 96. For example, Doyle found that at the EPA, 87.9 percent of requesters were commercial 
and 1.2 percent were news media; at the FDA, 26 percent were filed by what Doyle labels 
FOIA-service companies (what this Article labels information resellers) and only 3.8 percent 
from the news media, and that attorneys comprised the highest-volume population of requesters 
at the Department of Health and Human Services. Doyle, supra note 33, at 70–71, 97. The 
outlier was the NSA, at which commercial requesters were few, and the requesters making up 
largest group were individuals seeking information on unidentified flying objects, standing at 12 
percent of all requests. Id. at 80. 
 97. SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS, supra note 73. This study sought to characterize the 
makeup of requesters across government, and thus looked at one month’s worth (September 
2005) of FOIA logs from eleven departments and six large agencies. Id. The data is limited in 
that it is a relatively small sample from each agency, and of course now dates a decade old. 
Nonetheless, the various previous studies cited are a great jumping-off point for the work in this 
Article.  
 98. Michael Moss, Public Eye: Federal Service Gets Wider Use by Sleuths, Snoops – and 
Senators, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1996, at A1.  
 99. Brody Mullins & Christopher Weaver, Open-Government Laws Fuel Hedge-Fund 
Profits, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/opengovernment-laws-fuel-
hedgefund-profits-1379905298?tesla=y [http://perma.cc/B9ZX-YV5K] (examining 100,000 
federal records requests over a five-year period). 
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information “may not reach the public at all, remaining in the hands 
of the private interests that sought it out.”100 
Despite the widespread commercial use of FOIA, commercial 
requesters were barely contemplated or discussed at the enactment of 
FOIA,101 and it was not until 1986 that Congress addressed issues 
surrounding commercial requesters at all. Even then, it did so 
obliquely by passing amendments to FOIA as part of the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986 that changed how fees were charged, introducing 
the modern regime that requires agencies to assess fees that covered 
more of their costs as to commercial requesters than as to the news 
media and other requesters.102 Still, as this FOIA amendment was a 
relatively small and technical change buried in an otherwise massive 
piece of legislation, scant legislative history fails to reveal the extent 
to which Congress was aware of or concerned about commercial use 
of FOIA. 
Likewise, the practice of commercial FOIA requesting has never 
been given in-depth academic treatment. We have very little 
understanding of how corporations are using FOIA, what they are 
requesting, how they are profiting from that information, and at what 
cost the government is serving commercial interests in information. If 
the news media is not the dominant user of a law designed primarily 
for it, it is worth understanding what interests the law is serving more 
effectively. 
 
 100. Kevin G. Hall & Kevin Johnson, Open-Records Law Morphs into Tool for 
Corporations, Advocates, MCCLATCHY DC (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/
politics-government/article24781393.html [http://perma.cc/9DKL-YCNM]. This piece also 
quoted Matt Smith of the Center for Investigative Reporting: “Often it’s all law firms 
[requesting under FOIA], or if you Google names on a FOIA log they are industry investigators 
or their competitors . . . . It seems to be less sort of public-serving organizations and more 
individual interests that are using FOIA for something from which they can profit.” Id.  
 101. In fact, in voluminous debate, only two members of Congress raised the possibility 
during the debates: one inquired whether the maritime industry could use the law to learn about 
maritime construction subsidies, and another noted the potential for a contractor whose low bid 
was rejected to use FOIA to uncover the reasons why. Doyle, supra note 33, at 46. 
 102. See 132 CONG. REC. S14296–98 (1986) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). Interestingly, 
Senator Leahy, sponsor of the FOIA amendment, had a narrow view of commercial use:  
A commercial user is one who seeks information solely for a private, profit making 
purpose . . . . [R]equests from a corporation may be presumed to be for commercial 
use unless the requester can demonstrate that it qualifies for a different fee schedule. 
A request from an individual or a public interest group may not be presumed to be 
for commercial use unless the nature of the request suggests otherwise. The resale of 
documents obtained from the Government is not a commercial use. 
Id. 
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II.  COMMERCIAL USE OF FOIA 
No one denies commercial enterprises may have legitimate uses 
for FOIA or that they are entitled to use FOIA to further their 
financial interests. The ways in which commercial entities are using 
FOIA, however, is relatively unknown. By analyzing FOIA logs of a 
select group of agencies, this Part documents the commercial use of 
FOIA, and explains for what purposes businesses are using FOIA and 
how they are profiting from it. 
This Part does not, however, purport to represent government-
wide sampling or to report comprehensive government-wide statistics. 
Instead, it reports in-depth accounts of commercial FOIA use at a 
small selection of agencies. The agencies reported both represent a 
design choice to target agencies likely to have significant amounts of 
commercial requesting and a practical choice that flowed from the 
availability of meaningful FOIA data. As to the design choice, I first 
identified every government agency that reported more than one 
thousand requests received in FY 2013, such that the volume of 
requests would make the agency FOIA operations more than merely 
nominal, and then narrowed down the list to those that collected 
more than $10,000 in fees from requesters.103 Because commercial 
users are most often charged fees and in the greatest amounts, I 
suspected this metric would identify agencies with high levels of 
commercial requesting. I then sent each of those twenty-three 
identified agencies a FOIA request for their FOIA logs—the list of 
requests received along with various pieces of information about the 
request—for the calendar year 2013. I ended up studying the agencies 
 
 103. For the full list of agencies from which I culled based on these criteria, I used the 
Department of Justice’s online list of annual FOIA reports submitted in 2013. Annual FOIA 
Reports–FY13, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/oip/annual-foia-reports-fy13-0 
[http://perma.cc/UD7F-3AZ5]. The list of agencies that met my initial two criteria included 23 
federal agencies: Department of Defense (DOD) (Air Force); DOD (Army); DOD (Defense 
Logistics Agency); DOD (Navy); DOD (National Security Agency); Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) (Customs and Border Protections); DHS (Coast Guard); Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD); Department of Justice (DOJ) (Bureau of Prisons); 
DOJ (Drug Enforcement Agency); DOJ (Federal Bureau of Investigation); Department of 
Transportation (DOT) (Federal Aviation Administration); DOT (Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration); Department of Treasury (Internal Revenue Service); Department of Treasury 
(Office of the Comptroller of the Currency); Department of Agriculture (Forest Service); 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); Federal Trade Commission (FTC); Health and 
Human Services (HHS) (Center for Disease Control and Prevention); HHS (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services); HHS (Food and Drug Administration); HHS (National 
Institutes of Health); Securities and Exchange Commission; Small Business Administration; 
United States Postal Service. Id. 
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for which I was able to obtain complete data:104 the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), FDA, Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The 
findings regarding commercial use of FOIA at these agencies is 
presented below in that order, which is the descending order of the 
size of the agency’s FOIA operations as measured by the number of 
requests received. 
As described below, the data from these agencies shows the 
heavy use of FOIA by business as a direct input into their profit-
making enterprises. In fact, at the four largest FOIA offices studied, 
commercial requests represent the overwhelming majority of all 
requests received.105 Figure 1 reflects the breakdown of requesters at 
each of the studied agencies. 
  
 
 104. Specifically, data was complete if I was able to obtain all of the fields of the logs that I 
needed for the full calendar year of 2013, including the tracking number for the request, the 
date of the request, the identity of the requester, the subject matter of the request, the 
requester’s fee category, the actual fees charged to the requester, and the agency’s response 
(granted, denied, denied in part, or other). For the agencies to which I originally submitted 
requests but did not end up reporting results, either I did not receive any response within the 
time frame of the study, I received a partial response but was unable to obtain the remaining 
information within the time frame of the study, I received a response that indicated the agency 
would claim a right to withhold whole categories of information I needed and I was unable to 
devote resources to further battles over disclosure within the time frame of the study, or the 
agency claimed it simply did not keep some relevant field as part of their records.  
 105. This is true at the SEC (either 69 or 89 percent commercial requesters, depending on 
the categorization by SECProbes.com, discussed in further detail below), FDA (85 percent 
commercial requesters), EPA (79 percent commercial requesters), and DLA (96 percent 
commercial requesters). See infra notes 110, 112, 156, 238, 260 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 1: Requester Category by Agency 
 
Moreover, although not entirely uniform, there are strikingly 
similar patterns between agencies in the ways businesses profit from 
FOIA. Most notably, the data reveals that a cottage industry based on 
FOIA requesting has emerged; at five of the six studied agencies, 
some of the highest-volume requesters are companies whose business 
model is to request federal records under FOIA and resell those very 
records for a profit,106 and at two of these agencies, multiple 
information resellers compete against each other in the private 
market for public records.107 By contrast, the relative paucity of news 
media requests is apparent across the board. That is not to say that 
the news media requesting may not have had a positive, or even 
disproportionate, impact for each request made, but rather only to 
indicate that at the studied FOIA offices, the staff and resources are 
primarily serving commercial interests, not the public’s interest in 
knowing what its government is up to. 
 
 106. These five agencies are the SEC, FDA, EPA, DLA, and NIH. See Parts II.A, II.B, II.C, 
II.D & II.F. 
 107. These two agencies are the SEC and the FDA, the two largest FOIA offices studied. 
See Parts II.A–B. 
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A. Securities and Exchange Commission 
The SEC received a total of 12,091 requests in 2013,108 which 
makes it a midsize FOIA office compared to other federal agencies.109 
Of those, it reported 8292 commercial requests, or 69 percent, 2807 
news media requests, representing 23 percent, and 992 other requests, 
or 8 percent of the total number.110 Though commercial requesters 
clearly dominate, these numbers deceptively suggest that journalists 
make far more requests than is likely accurate. The 2807 news media 
requests comprise a far higher proportion than the other studied 
agencies. Of these purported news media requests, however, 2498 (all 
but 309 requests) came from a single requester, SECProbes.com,111 
whose status as a news media requester is dubious, as explained 
below. If SECProbes.com were designated a commercial requester, as 
it likely should be, commercial requests would make up 89 percent of 
all requests, and news media requests only 3 percent.112 
Compared to other agencies, the highest-volume requesters at 
the SEC request far more often, meaning that the vast bulk of all 
requesting comes from very few companies. For example, in addition 
to SECProbes.com, which itself accounts for 21 percent of all SEC 
requests, the next highest-volume requesters include International 
Business Research (IBR), which made 2155 requests, or 18 percent of 
the SEC total; Check Fund Manager, LLC, which made 1820 
requests, or 15 percent of the SEC total; Bioscience Advisors, which 
made 1323 requests, or 11 percent of the SEC total; and EACM 
 
 108. U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm., Freedom of Information Act Responses to Sept. 5, 2014, 
Feb. 12, 2015, Feb. 13, 2015, and Apr. 21, 2015 Requests by Margaret B. Kwoka (on file with 
author) [hereinafter SEC Data]. For this and for each other agency dataset I compiled, the 
responses include a spreadsheet of the log of all requests filed in calendar year 2013, as well as 
copies of some particular FOIA request letters that were logged in that spreadsheet about which 
I wanted more information. When I cite to the spreadsheet, I pincite the line on the spreadsheet 
by “Request Number.” When I cite to a copy of a letter obtained under FOIA, I pincite to that 
letter by “Request Letter.”  
 109. See DOJ, SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 3 (2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/fy2013-annual-report-
summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/A5S9-H7AP] [hereinafter DOJ, FY 2013 SUMMARY] (reporting 
that seven agencies, all department level, received more than 20,000 requests in FY 2013, 
twenty-two agencies received between 1,000 and 19,000 requests, and another twenty-seven 
received between 100 and 900).  
 110. SEC Data, supra note 108. Here, I am combining both those designated as “other 
requesters,” which are 7 percent, and those designated as educational/noncommercial, which are 
1 percent, for the purpose of reporting. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  
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Advisors, LLC, which made 726 requests, or 6 percent of the SEC 
total.113 That means that the top five requesters accounted for 8522 of 
the 12,091 requests made to the SEC in 2013, or 70 percent.114 
To begin with the largest requester, SECProbes.com is a 
nonfunctioning website registered to John Gavin,115 who also submits 
the requests on behalf of the organization.116 Because SECProbes.com 
does not exist as a functioning website, Mr. Gavin’s other activities 
may illustrate its planned or intended purpose. A 2006 New York 
Times profile of Mr. Gavin described him as a “former money 
manager and chartered financial analyst” who founded a company 
called SEC Insight after leaving American Express.117 SEC Insight 
was based on the model of requesting information from the SEC and 
keeping a “focus list” of companies on which he obtained 
information, accompanied by various added warnings such as 
“troubled” and “monitor,” which indicated potential regulatory 
risks.118 His clients were largely mutual funds and hedge funds, and he 
charged “upward of $50,000 a year for his service.”119 SEC Insight was 
seemingly deemed at the time a commercial requester, as the 
commercial nature of his requests was apparently undisputed in a 
lawsuit he brought over certain denials.120 SEC Insight, which was 
later renamed Disclosure Insight, eventually closed in 2012, after a 
major investor suffered serious losses.121 
Mr. Gavin’s own profile says he is “creating [his] next company 
and finding others to invest in.”122 He appears, however, to have 
moved his business model to a website and company called “Probes 
 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. WHOIS search results for: SECProbes.com, GODADDY, WHOIS DATABASE, https://
who.godaddy.com/whoisstd.aspx?domain=secprobes.com&prog_id=GoDaddy&k=ZhKWfJS
B%20tx2VpVmMEJO9164vR0gmWzcOeDyc8t2j%20iv7CmiFsbRaZ9WiO2gSpJa [http://
perma.cc/64YR-YG2Q] (listing John Gavin as the registrant).  
 116. SEC Data, supra note 108. 
 117. Gretchen Morgenson, Deafened by the S.E.C.’s Silence, He Sued, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/28/business/yourmoney/28gavin.html [http://perma.cc/
PAB4-ZXCH]. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Gavin v. SEC , Civil No. 04-4522, 2007 WL 2454156, at *15 (D. Minn. Aug. 23, 2007) 
(denying a request for an attorneys’ fees award to prevailing plaintiff Gavin in part because he 
was a “commercial requestor”).  
 121. Who is John Gavin?, QUIET INNOVATION, http://quietinnovation.com/who-is-john-
gavin [http://perma.cc/B9PN-KSSE]. 
 122. Id. 
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Reporter,”123 which seems to function as the same entity as or an 
updated version of SECProbes.com. This can be inferred from the 
fact that Probes Reporter advertises using FOIA requests to obtain 
information it provides in its various services,124 but no Probes 
Reporter requests were listed in the SEC FOIA log.125 Probes 
Reporter makes no secret that a large part of its service is to make 
available the records it obtains under FOIA, including copies of its 
original FOIA request and the original government response.126 
Probes Reporter offers two service levels, the lower of which costs 
$1,187 per year for access to various FOIA requested records and 
reports, and the higher of which begins at $15,000 a year for more 
customized service and access to “[a]ll of [Probes Reporter's] 
content.”127 
Whether its previous free access to much of its content, now 
discontinued, made Probes Reporter a genuine news media outlet at 
the time of its 2013 requests, or whether that was merely an attempt 
to drive traffic for its future commercial information-reselling 
services, now realized, remains unascertainable.128 In either case, Mr. 
Gavin’s requests appear to uniformly target SEC investigations of 
 
 123. PROBES REP., http://www.probesreporter.com [http://perma.cc/C7G5-D55V].  
 124. About Us, PROBES REP., http://probesreporter.com/about-us [http://perma.cc/V2MX-
PNTP]. The website details Probes Reporter’s history: 
  Probes Reporter’s origins date back to 2000, when Mr. Gavin started SEC 
Insight/Disclosure Insight. Disclosure Insight™ is now a trademark and research 
product line belonging to and produced by Probes Reporter. 
  Since the late 90’s, Mr. Gavin has been steadily filing FOIA requests with the 
SEC. These requests primarily seek records pertaining to investigations the SEC 
conducts on publicly-traded companies. Responses received and records released in 
response to these FOIA requests may then be incorporated into research reports 
published and disseminated to the investing public by Probes Reporter. 
Id. 
 125. SEC Data, supra note 108.  
 126. See About Us, PROBES REP., supra note 124; see also Service Levels, PROBES REP., 
http://probesreporter.com/service-levels [http://perma.cc/A52Y-PYH2] (advertising access to 
“[r]esults from over 2,500 Freedom of Information Act requests we file annually with the 
SEC”). 
 127. Service Levels, PROBES REP., https://probesreporter.com/service-levels [http://perma.cc/
A52Y-PYH2]. 
 128. A review of a sample of Mr. Gavin’s request letters reveals nothing more about his 
purpose. The only statement regarding his fee category reads identically in each one: “As I 
qualify as a non-commercial requestor there should be no fees related to this request.” See SEC 
Data, supra note 108, at Request Letters 13-11060-FOIA, 13-11953-FOIA, 13-03667-FOIA, 14-
02797-FOIA, 13-06337-FOIA, 14-01226-FOIA, 13-06113-FOIA, 14-02241-FOIA, 13-03126-
FOIA, 13-03438-FOIA, 13-06671-FOIA, 14-01680-FOIA. 
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particular companies.129 In a small sample of his request letters that 
were reviewed, Mr. Gavin requested identical categories of records 
from the “main investigative file” of any investigation concerning a 
named company: correspondence to and from the company or with a 
third party about the company, subpoenas, official notice of a 
probable legal action (called “Wells notices”), investigative orders, 
and opening and closing reports.130 
However SECProbes.com should have been characterized, other 
high-volume requesters are most certainly information resellers. One 
such company, Bioscience Advisors—which is the fourth largest SEC 
requester, having filed 1323 requests in 2013—is a “consulting and 
database firm focused on biopharma alliances.”131 Its signature service 
is a database called BioSciDB, which contains copies of “over 12,000 
license, development, co-development, joint venture, distribution, 
asset purchase and other arm’s-length agreements that have been 
publicly filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.”132 
In fact, it advertises that most of the documents in the database were 
“obtained via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.”133 In a 
sample of the types of products available within the database, it 
describes the records and then provides a “link to the full FOIA 
contract.”134 In addition to raw records, it provides various contract 
comparison tools and best practices.135 A one-year subscription to this 
database service costs $9,500.136 Consistent with that purpose, all but 
one of the company’s FOIA requests in 2013 sought exhibits that 
regulated entities included in SEC filings like annual or quarterly 
 
 129. SEC Data, supra note 108. 
 130. See SEC Data, supra note 108, at Request Letters 13-11060-FOIA (concerning 
DirectTV Grp., Inc.), 13-11953-FOIA (Goodrich Corp.), 13-03667-FOIA (InterMune Inc.), 14-
02797-FOIA (Capital One Fin. Corp.), 13-06337-FOIA (AllianceBernstein Holding LP), 14-
01226-FOIA (Taro Pharmas. Indus. Ltd.), 13-06113-FOIA (Systemax Inc.), 14-02241-FOIA 
(Huntsman Corp.), 13-03126-FOIA (Heartland Express, Inc.), 13-03438-FOIA (Helen of Troy 
Ltd.), 13-06671-FOIA (Darling International Inc.), 14-01680-FOIA (Core Laboratories, N.V.). 
A “Wells notice” is a letter from the SEC to a regulated party notifying the party of a probable 
legal action to be taken by the SEC. See Mark Koba, Wells Notice—CNBC Explains, CNBC 
(Nov. 28, 2012, 9:34 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/45612974 [http://perma.cc/GA9R-MRAY]. 
 131. About Mark Edwards, BIOSCIENCE ADVISORS, http://www.biosciadvisors.com/about 
[http://perma.cc/R6KH-FDJ4].  
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Features, BIOSCIDB, https://www.bioscidb.com/features [http://perma.cc/3R99-VXRF]. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Pricing, BIOSCIDB, https://www.bioscidb.com/pricing [http://perma.cc/8HC7-ZCHC].  
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reports and reports of material corporate events.137 In such exhibits is 
precisely where the company is mostly likely to find the types of 
licenses and other contracts that make up its BioSciDB database.138 
Another information reseller is RoyaltyStat LLC, which 
submitted 548 requests to the SEC in 2013.139 RoyaltyStat offers 
various online databases, including a license agreement database, 
which “contains 16,750 (live count) unique and unredacted license 
agreements filed with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and from other sources.”140 It, too, requests exhibits to public 
filings where those very license agreements are likely to be located.141 
A sample of its request letters demonstrates that the exhibits it 
requests have titles such as “License Agreement” and “Collaborative 
Agreement,”142 “Intellectual Property License Agreement,”143 and 
“Know-How And Patent License,”144 thus evidencing that it is 
requesting the records it makes available under its database service. 
 
 137. SEC Data, supra note 108 (demonstrating all but one request concerned exhibits to 
forms such as 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K forms); see also Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm [http://perma.cc/J43H-XBZR] (describing 
annual report form 10-K); Form 10-Q, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/form10q.htm [http://perma.cc/62DN-5R4R] (describing quarterly report form 10-Q); 
Form 8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm [http://
perma.cc/4JP8-4N2M] (describing report of material corporate event form 8-K). 
 138. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2015) (enumerating the material contracts that must be 
attached as exhibits to public SEC filings). Normally public filings are all available through the 
SEC’s online EDGAR database. See EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.
sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html [http://perma.cc/5MG6-VSA8]. Review of a few 
of the request letters, however, suggests that the requested exhibits were originally submitted 
under SEC’s confidential treatment process, and thus not originally made public through its 
database of public filings. See SEC Data, supra note 108, at Request Letters 13-04215-FOIA, 13-
07473-FOIA, & 14-02162-FOIA. Because confidential treatment at the time of filing is not 
definitive of the rights of a FOIA requester, and because that treatment can be time limited, a 
FOIA request for such records is hardly futile, as evidenced by the 881 such requests made by 
Bioscience Advisors that were granted in full, and an additional twenty-two that were granted in 
part. SEC Data, supra note 108; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b–2 (setting out the confidential 
treatment process). 
 139. SEC Data, supra note 108. 
 140. Databases, ROYALTYSTAT, http://www.royaltystat.com/ourdatabases.cfm [http://perma.
cc/C7KK-HQHP]. 
 141. SEC Data, supra note 108. Although the request letters do not specify as such, it is 
likely that these records, too, were originally submitted for confidential treatment, and thus 
were not already available on the SEC database. See supra note 138.  
 142. SEC Data, supra note 108, at Request Letter 14-02682-FOIA.  
 143. Id. at Request Letter 14-02643-FOIA. 
 144. Id. at Request Letter 14-01762-FOIA; see also id. at Request Letters 14-01775-FOIA, 
14-00584-FOIA, 13-04998-FOIA (evidencing similar titles of requested documents). 
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Another set of commercial requesters is due diligence research 
firms, which provide reasonable research to protect against risk prior 
to a business deal. International Business Research submitted a total 
of 2155 requests.145 Each request has a particular individual or 
business entity listed as the subject matter, and a review of a sampling 
of IBR’s request letters reveals a formulaic approach: it consistently 
requests all investigative records in which the subject is listed for the 
past twenty-five years.146 In turn, IBR is a due-diligence research firm, 
for which investigative records would be useful, and it specializes in 
providing information to clients prior to initial public offerings, 
mergers and acquisitions, and various other types of large business 
deals.147 Among its primary clients are large public companies and 
investment banks, all regulated by the SEC.148 Similarly, Check Fund 
Manager, LLC, which submitted 1820 requests to the SEC, is 
primarily an investor due-diligence firm.149 These firms, of course, 
charge their clients (unadvertised rates) for their investigations, some 
component of which are no doubt based on the information received 
in response to their FOIA requests. Investment companies 
themselves are also frequent requesters. For instance, EACM 
 
 145. SEC Data, supra note 108. 
 146. See id. at Request Letters 13-03098-FOIA (concerning Jolson Merchant Partners, Inc.), 
13-03655-FOIA (Dimitrios Raptis), 13-05167-FOIA (Corinne H. Lyle a/k/a Nin Lyle), 13-08247-
FOIA (Matthew L. Sherman), 13-09170-FOIA (MigraTEC, Inc.), 13-10997-FOIA (G-Force 1 
LLC), 13-11466-FOIA (Brentwood Beauty Labs. Int’l Inc.), 14-00256-FOIA (Mac Motors Inc.), 
14-00365-FOIA (Corbin Capital Partners). 
 147. About, INT’L BUS. RES., http://ibrusa.com/#about [http://perma.cc/A38L-SNQQ]. 
 148. Id. 
 149. About Us, CHECK FUND MANAGER, http://www.checkfundmanager.com/aboutus.html 
[http://perma.cc/H48S-H4DK]. A sampling of Check Fund Manager’s requests reveals a pattern 
of requesting “records of consumer complaints, civil complaints, investigations, or preliminary 
inquiries” regarding the subject of the request. See SEC Data, supra note 108, at Request 
Letters 13-03997-FOIA, 13-04856-FOIA, 13-06060-FOIA, 13-10123-FOIA, 13-10555-FOIA, 14-
01130-FOIA, 14-01414-FOIA, 14-01475-FOIA, 14-02693-FOIA, 13-03328-FOIA, 13-03893-
FOIA, 13-04578-FOIA, 13-05608-FOIA, 13-05743-FOIA, 13-06921-FOIA, 13-08874-FOIA, 13-
09586-FOIA, 13-09804-FOIA, 14-01302-FOIA, 14-01705-FOIA, 14-02279-FOIA, 13-03058-
FOIA, 13-03411-FOIA, 13-04378-FOIA. 
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Advisors, LLC, submitted 726 requests.150 It is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of BNY Mellon, a large investment services company.151 
Excluding SECProbes.com, the news media requesters supply 
only 3 percent of all SEC requests.152 The Wall Street Journal 
submitted 99 of those requests, Thompson Reuters submitted 81 
(under the name of a Reuters journalist), The Hill submitted 23, 
Bloomberg 29, Center for Public Integrity 14, and all other news 
media outlets less than 10.153 Anomalously, Aguirre Law, APC, a law 
firm that does plaintiffs’ side financial litigation, submitted 37 
requests that were deemed news media requests for unknown 
reasons.154 
B. Food and Drug Administration 
In 2013, the FDA received a total of 10,167 requests.155 Of those 
requests, a full 75 percent were from commercial requesters, who 
filed 7615 requests with the FDA that year.156 By comparison, the 
news media filed only 1222 requests, or 12 percent, and all other 
requesters represented 13 percent, or 1330 requests.157 
Although regulated companies have what might be an apparent 
interest in FDA records, FDA’s most frequent requesters are not, 
say, pharmaceutical companies, but instead are information resellers. 
For example, the single highest-volume requester is a company called 
FOI Services, Inc., which submitted 571 requests in 2013.158 FOI 
Services, Inc. is a privately held, for-profit corporation founded in 
1975 whose sole business model is to request, under FOIA, FDA 
 
 150. SEC Data, supra note 108. A sample of EACM requests reveals a pattern of requesting 
“non-public correspondence for any consumer complaints, investigations and/or disciplinary 
actions” of the subject matter. See id. at Request Letters 13-04041-FOIA (regarding concerning 
Global Credit Advisors LLC), 13-04605-FOIA (regarding Tybourne Equity (US) Fund), 13-
06310-FOIA (regarding Brett S. Klein), 13-07497-FOIA (regarding VP Distributors LLC), 13-
09811-FOIA (regarding OZ Master Fund Ltd.), 14-01807-FOIA (regarding David K. Riley).  
 151. Overview, EACM ADVISORS, LLC, http://www.eacm.com/web/eacm-advisors/overview 
[http://perma.cc/X5WX-BADP].  
 152. SEC Data, supra note 108. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Freedom of Information 
Act Responses to June 24, 2014, Feb. 12, 2015, Feb. 13, 2015 and Apr. 21, 2015 Requests by 
Margaret B. Kwoka (on file with author) [hereinafter FDA Data]. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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records and resell access to those records to interested parties.159 It 
both maintains a “private collection” of FDA documents, access to 
which can be purchased, and offers a service of “custom” FOIA 
requests, in which FOI Services, Inc. charges clients to request the 
desired records under FOIA and manage the process with the FDA.160 
The majority of its requests concern facilities inspection reports, 
premarket notifications for medical devices, the FOIA logs 
themselves, and new drug applications.161 
Another information reseller that engages in high-volume 
requesting at FDA is FDA News.162 Although FDA News may sound 
like a news media organization, in fact its FOIA practice feeds a 
business model not unlike that of FOI Services, Inc.163 FDA News 
made 237 FDA requests in 2013, nearly all of which were classified as 
commercial.164 The vast majority of its requests were for FDA Form 
483s, which are facility inspection reports.165 In turn, FDA News 
markets a product called 483sOnline.com, which provides “instant, 
unlimited access to more than 3100 Form 483s.”166 For a one-year 
 
 159. About Us, FOI SERVS., INC., http://www.foiservices.com/brochure/about.cfm [http://
perma.cc/JPN5-QMB3]. 
 160. Document Retrieval, FOI SERVS., INC., http://www.foiservices.com/brochure/doc
retrieval.cfm [http://perma.cc/U3UP-SN8U].  
 161. FDA Data, supra note 155.  
 162. Id.  
 163. To be sure, some of FDA News’s services are not pure information reselling, but rather 
are value-added information products that FDA News has generated, such as newsletters, 
trainings, and even books. See FDA NEWS, http://www.fdanews.com [http://perma.cc/HS3N-
Z4YT]. Nonetheless, the content of FDA News’s requests makes clear that it primarily feeds a 
database product that purely resells information, as described below.  
 164. Only five requests made by FDA News were not deemed commercial, and those were 
designated as news media requests. There are an additional ninety requests made under a 
similar but differently formatted name, of which twenty-two were designated news media 
requests. See FDA Data, supra note 155. Upon inspecting two FDA News request letters 
categorized as news media and two categorized as commercial, no apparent difference in 
content or purpose explained the different labels. Compare id. at Request Letters 2013-23 
(commercial), 2013-258 (commercial), with id. at Request Letters 2013-154 (news media), 2013-
7161 (news media).  
 165. FDA Form 483 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.
fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/ucm256377.htm [http://perma.cc/MVT6-GR6N] (last updated Apr. 
23, 2015). The remaining FOIA requests were mostly requests for FDA’s FOIA logs. FDA 
Data, supra note 155.  
 166. Form 483, FDA NEWS, http://www.fdanews.com/form483 [http://perma.cc/G3CR-
2AJF]. 
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subscription to this service, FDA News charges $997, or particular 
forms can be purchased individually for $117 each.167 
Interestingly, at least one frequent requester, Washington 
Information Source (WIS), which made 344 requests in 2013,168 is 
inconsistently categorized. For 78 percent of its requests, it obtained 
news media status, and for the remaining 22 percent it was classified 
as a commercial requester.169 In fact, its 269 news media-designated 
requests ranked it as the most frequent news media requester, even 
though it was not always categorized as such.170 Nonetheless, a look at 
its business model and its requesting pattern suggests that it, too, 
engages in information reselling,171 while also marketing expensive 
original materials such as books, manuals, and newsletters to 
interested regulated companies.172 
The records WIS requested under FOIA fall into a few broad 
categories. Of WIS’s total 344 requests, more than ninety of them 
were for FDA’s FOIA logs for various intervals of time.173 Another 
handful was for specific FOIA request letters.174 Of the remainder, the 
vast majority were for records related to particular inspections: FDA 
observation forms, inspection reports, warning letters, and 
subsequent correspondence with the inspected entity.175 
In turn, WIS offers a variety of information products that 
evidently incorporate, rely on, or often simply resell these requested 
 
 167. Id. (to see individual price, click on the “download” button next to an individual 
report).  
 168. FDA Data, supra note 155.  
 169. Id. Out of 344 total requests by WIS, 269 were designated news media and seventy-five 
were designated commercial requests. Again, from looking at a sample, it was not possible to 
identify differences in content that would explain differing categorizations. For example, two 
requests contained identical language requesting news media status, and one was granted and 
another was not. Compare id. at Request Letter 2013-7573 (news media), with id. at Request 
Letter 2013-7962 (commercial). 
 170. Id.  
 171. As described below, some of the products it markets are databases of FDA records of 
the very sort WIS frequently requests under FOIA. See infra text accompanying note 183. 
 172. About Washington Information Source, FDAINFO.COM, http://www.fdainfo.com/index.
php?id=about [http://perma.cc/Q6ZG-XJ2L]; About WIS…, FDAINFO.COM, http://www.fda
info.com/index.php?id=history [http://perma.cc/V4PD-L37E].  
 173. FDA Data, supra note 155. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id.; see, e.g., id. at Request Letters 2013-7557, 2013-7708, 2013-8076, 2013-8405. The last 
substantial category is of requests that apparently pertain to food production matters, such as 
requests for “Food Contact Notification” documents, a type of notification to FDA about 
packaging that will come into contact with marketed food products, and animal feed additives. 
See, e.g., id. at Request Numbers 2013-3078, 2013-7005, 2013-8459. 
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records. For example, it offers, for approximately a thousand dollars, 
a full database of “all the critical inspection records you need,” 
including thousands of inspection observation forms and 
establishment inspection reports, “providing you with more than 15 
years of FDA inspection history.”176 These are the very same types of 
forms that constitute a sizeable portion of records that WIS requests 
under FOIA.177 It also sells individually the premarket notifications 
submitted by companies that want to market a new medical device178 
at between $25 and $690 each,179 and the subsequent premarket 
approvals issued by the FDA180 at $20.50 to $145 each.181 
Even apart from simply selling databases of FDA records as one 
aspect of its business, WIS’s flagship products, a series of newsletters 
that are available by annual subscription and range from $999 per 
year to $2,495 per year,182 also rely on FOIA-obtained records. One 
such newsletter summarizes FDA warning letters to drug and device 
manufacturers categorized by industry and is marketed as enabling 
the consumer to avoid costly and disruptive FDA investigations, 
research competition, and quickly access FDA inspection 
documents.183 Those FDA inspection documents are the same 
categories of documents routinely requested by WIS.184 
 
 176. 483s/EIRs on DVD ROM Entire Set, FDADOCUMENTS.ORG, http://www.fdadocu
ments.org/483s-eirs-on-dvd-rom-entire-set [http://perma.cc/PH37-W83E]. FDADocuments.org 
is the website for the RECORD-RETRIEVE Service, a subsidiary of Washington Information 
Source Company. About Us, FDADOCUMENTS.ORG, http://www.fdadocuments.org/about-us/ 
[http://perma.cc/WCN7-LRMZ]. 
 177. FDA Data, supra note 155.  
 178. These are known as 510(k)s. 510(k) Clearances, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://
www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApprovalsandClearances/
510kClearances [http://perma.cc/8AUX-MFK3] (last updated Jan. 13, 2015).  
 179. 510Ks, FDADOCUMENTS.ORG, http://www.fdadocuments.org/510ks/?sort=pricedesc 
[http://perma.cc/DVE7-4LN7]. 
 180. These are known as PMAs. Premarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Medicaldevices/Deviceregulationandguidance/Howtomarketyourdevice/Pre
marketsubmissions/Premarketapprovalpma/Default.Htm [http://perma.cc/3XQA-BH6Z] (last 
updated Aug. 19, 2014). 
 181. PMAs, FDADOCUMENTS.ORG, http://www.fdadocuments.org/pmas [http://perma.cc/
UC93-27BV].  
 182. Newsletters, FDADOCUMENTS.ORG, http://www.fdadocuments.org/newsletters [http://
perma.cc/W6Z3-9LKA]. 
 183. Warning Letter Bulletin, FDADOCUMENTS.ORG, http://www.fdadocuments.org/
warning-letter-bulletin [http://perma.cc/576T-G8KB]. To view a sample issue, see 22 WARNING 
LETTER BULL., no. 9, Sept. 2009, http://www.fdainfo.com/samples/warningletter.pdf [http://
perma.cc/K67C-MVUF].  
 184. FDA Data, supra note 155.  
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Another newsletter, “Adverse Event Reporting News,” again 
contains original content, in this instance describing FDA-reported 
safety-related concerns for drugs and medical devices.185 But this 
product also includes discounted access to the underlying adverse 
event reports from FDA, for which WIS advertises, “we file FOIA 
requests for you!”186 WIS also advertises as part of its newsletter 
subscriber services that it can provide “[i]nformation on which firms 
are trying to get copies of the reports you filed with FDA,”187 which 
presumably is why WIS frequently requests FDA’s FOIA logs. 
A variant on an information reseller, such as FOI Services, Inc., 
is a for-profit enterprise that resells the information with more added 
value. The second-largest FDA requester, Thomson Reuters,188 fits 
this description. Thomson Reuters has both a media outlet (Reuters 
News Agency) and a host of business-related information services, 
including services in the financial, intellectual property, legal, life 
sciences, scientific research, and accounting areas.189 Notably, the 
requests that Thomson Reuters makes of FDA are unlikely to be on 
behalf of the media outlet because the FDA classifies almost all of 
them as commercial requests.190 Instead, the more than 500 requests 
the company submitted in 2013191 must be almost entirely for the 
purpose of their other profit-making information products. 
Based on the various services it offers, Thomson Reuters’s FOIA 
requests most likely produce information used in a series of for-pay 
database products under the umbrella name Cortellis, which covers 
life sciences industries.192 In particular, Cortellis Regulatory 
Intelligence, a product that provides information about regulatory 
compliance for drugs and medical devices, is advertised as 
 
 185. Adverse Event Reporting News, FDAINFO.COM, http://www.fdainfo.com/index.php?id=
aern [http://perma.cc/95KA-62CG]. To view a sample issue, see 11 ADVERSE EVENT 
REPORTING NEWS, Oct. 7, 2014, http://www.fdainfo.com/samples/adversenews.pdf [http://
perma.cc/TH6Y-MTQ9].  
 186. Adverse Event Reporting News, supra note 185. 
 187. Adverse Event Reporting News, FDADOCUMENTS.ORG, http://www.fdadocuments.org/
adverse-event-reporting-news/ [http://perma.cc/QB57-LUHB].  
 188. FDA Data, supra note 155. 
 189. About Us, THOMSON REUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/about-us [http://perma.cc/
HBV7-MKH2]. 
 190. FDA Data, supra note 155. Specifically, 509 of 527 requests were classified as 
commercial. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Cortellis, THOMSON REUTERS, http://lifesciences.thomsonreuters.com/products/
cortellis [http://perma.cc/9PF5-AVPF].  
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“includ[ing] documents obtained through FOI[A] requests.”193 
Another product, Cortellis Competitive Intelligence, provides 
intelligence on pharmaceutical companies, marketed as a way to 
“[t]rack your closest competitors.”194 A host of other products 
likewise track regulatory developments, primarily those that would be 
located at the FDA, both as to general industries and as to particular 
products or companies.195 
In particular, the vast majority of Thomson Reuters’s requests 
concern FDA-generated reports following agency inspections, known 
as Establishment Inspection Reports, or EIRs, and subsequent 
correspondence between the FDA and the inspected facility.196 This 
information appears to be made available in various forms through 
Cortellis Regulatory Intelligence, including through a service about 
warning letters the FDA issues following inspections.197 
In contrast, regulated companies are bit players in the FOIA 
requester landscape at FDA. The only high-volume requester in this 
category, Merck & Co., Inc., a large pharmaceutical company, filed 
373 requests in 2013.198 However, a full 318 of those were for copies of 
other FOIA requests made in the past,199 copies of records produced 
in response to certain past FOIA requests,200 or logs of all FOIA 
requests made or fulfilled during particular time periods.201 That is, 
 
 193. Cortellis Regulatory Intelligence: Features & Benefits, THOMSON REUTERS, http://
thomsonreuters.com/en/products-services/pharma-life-sciences/regulatory-affairs/product-
overview/features-benefits.html [http://perma.cc/S3UF-D7B6]. 
 194. Pharma Competitive Intelligence, THOMSON REUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/
pharma-life-sciences/pharma-competitive-intelligence [http://perma.cc/KAW7-YFAP]. 
 195. For example, one product provides “[d]ynamic, relevant drug news and e-mail alerts 
posted every business day.” Drug News, THOMSON REUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/drug-
news/?subsector=drug-development [http://perma.cc/8KJG-VQJ6]. Another focuses on news in 
the medical device industry, advertising that it “[t]rack[s] new regulatory actions by the FDA 
and other agencies.” Medical Device Daily, THOMSON REUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/
medical-device-daily/?subsector=pharmaceutical-research [http://perma.cc/D8K8-SL2B].  
 196. FDA Data, supra note 155; see also Procedure for Release of Establishment Inspection 
Report, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/FieldManagement
Directives/ucm103299.htm [http://perma.cc/SNQ8-U7JF] (last updated May 18, 2015) 
(describing the FDA’s procedures for releasing EIRs). 
 197. See Cyril Carrere, Examining Foreign Inspection Related FDA Warning Letters, 
THOMSON REUTERS: LIFE SCI. CONNECT (Jan. 27, 2014), https://lsconnect.thomsonreuters.com/
fda-foreign-inspection-related-warning-letters [http://perma.cc/L368-TKYT].  
 198. FDA Data, supra note 155. 
 199. See, e.g., id. at Request Letters 2013-1004, 2013-2280, 2013-2329, 2013-4178, 2013-4755, 
2013-4766, 2013-5840, 2013-6390, 2013-7365, 2013-9340. 
 200. See, e.g., id. at Request Letters 2013-6827, 2013-6949, 2013-6993, 2013-7040. 
 201. See, e.g., id. at Request Letters 2013-842, 2013-843, 2013-6892. 
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more than eight out of ten of Merck’s requests were about other 
people’s FOIA requests. A small sample suggests that through these 
requests Merck is seeking to learn what others are requesting 
pertaining to itself.202 Its remaining requests concerned a variety of 
other matters, such as reports of adverse drug events made to the 
FDA about Merck’s own products203 and records related to FDA 
inspections of facilities with which Merck appears to have a 
relationship.204 
Other industry requesters account for a far smaller volume of 
requests. The next most frequent such requester, Eli Lilly & Co., for 
example, made fifty-six requests; all but one concerned reports 
resulting from FDA inspections,205 many of which apparently concern 
facilities that are used to manufacture its own products.206 For 
example, it submitted a set of requests about PETNET Solutions 
 
 202. The following examples are illustrative. Merck’s request letter 2013-4755 asks for the 
request letter for request number 2013-3633, which is a law firm’s request for information about 
clinical trials for a particular type of administration of a drug Merck manufactures, Temodar. 
See id. at Request Letters 2013-3633, 2013-4755; see also Products, MERCK, http://www.merck.
com/product/home.html [http://perma.cc/24A4-J6XW] (listing Temodar as a Merck product). 
Merck’s request 2013-9340 asks for the request letter for request number 2013-8434, which is a 
request about adverse events reported for the drug Propecia, a Merck product. See FDA Data, 
supra note 155, at Request Letters 2013-8434, 2013-9340; see also Products, supra (listing 
Propecia as a Merck product). Merck’s request 2013-2280 asks for the request letter for request 
number 2013-1415, which is a request by INC Research, described infra notes 212–15 and 
accompanying text, for information pertaining to Januvia, another Merck product. See FDA 
Data, supra note 155, at Request Letters 2013-1415, 2013-2280; see also JANUVIA, MERCK 
HELPS, http://www.merckhelps.com/JANUVIA [http://perma.cc/78PH-MDQ7] (offering Merck 
assistance in providing Januvia). 
 203. See, e.g., FDA Data, supra note 155, at Request Letters 2013-4231, 2013-5647. 
 204. For example, Request Letter 2013-5788 asks for inspection reports concerning 
Laboratoire Unither in France, which manufactures a Merck product. Id. at Request Letter 
2013-5788; see also MERCK, PATIENT INFORMATION: ZIOPTAN 5, https://www.merck.com/
product/usa/pi_circulars/z/zioptan/zioptan_ppi.pdf [http://perma.cc/7RC6-N85R] (last updated 
Aug. 2013) (stating that Laboratoire Unither manufactures Merck product Zioptan). 
 205. FDA Data, supra note 155. That the requests concerned inspections was ascertained by 
examining the subject matter of the request as summarized by FDA in its FOIA logs. Every 
entry for Eli Lilly either contained the designation of a particular “EIR,” which is an 
abbreviation for “Establishment Inspection Report,” or “483,” which is short for FDA Form 
483, an inspectional observations form used by FDA. See FDA Form 483 Frequently Asked 
Questions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/ucm256377.htm 
[http://perma.cc/74GT-XLWA]; FDA Data, supra note 155.  
 206. Certainly not all of the requests concerned facilities about which a connection to Eli 
Lilly was ascertainable, but many did. See, e.g., FDA Data, supra note 155, at Request Number 
2013-7592 (requesting inspection records related to Dyax Corp.); Press release, Dyax Corp., 
Dyax Corp. Highlights Recent Progress in Licensing and Funded Research Portfolio (Sept. 22, 
2014), http://investor.dyax.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=871840 [http://perma.cc/8T48-NX
PW] (noting Dyax’s joint ventures with Eli Lilly); see also infra notes 207–10.  
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facilities,207 which contracts with Eli Lilly to manufacture and 
distribute an Eli Lilly product,208 and another set concerning Fisher 
Clinical Services,209 which distributes clinical trial materials for Eli 
Lilly.210 In the only non-inspection-related request, Eli Lilly requested 
a new drug application made by AbbVie, a competitor drug company, 
in 1981.211 
There is also a sizeable category of commercial requesters whose 
interests are less apparent, largely because they provide services to 
other for-profit entities but their clients’ identities are not public. For 
instance, INC Research made 139 requests in 2013, about half of 
which were for inspection-related documents for particular 
facilities,212 and the remainder of which ranged from new drug 
applications213 to drug approval documents214 to requests to introduce 
a biologic product into interstate commerce.215 EAS Consulting, a 
consulting group “[s]pecializing in FDA [r]egulatory [m]atters,”216 
likewise requested on a range of matters,217 as did Favus Institutional 
 
 207. See FDA Data, supra note 155, at Request Numbers 2013-766, 2013-898, 2013-899, 
2103-900.  
 208. Siemens PETNET Solutions Signs Nationwide Commercial Agreement to Manufacture 
and Distribute Lilly’s Molecular Imaging Agent, PR NEWSWIRE (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.pr
newswire.com/news-releases/siemens-petnet-solutions-signs-nationwide-commercial-agreement-
to-manufacture-and-distribute-lillys-molecular-imaging-agent-133357843.html [http://perma.cc/
2D64-WZLT]. 
 209. See FDA Data, supra note 155, at Request Numbers 2013-4011, 2013-4012, 2013-4013, 
2013-4014. 
 210. Press Release, Lilly, Thermo Fisher Scientific and Lilly Announce Expanded Clinical 
Trial Materials Relationship (Mar. 26, 2010), https://investor.lilly.com/releasedetail.cfm?release
id=454894 [http://perma.cc/LY3Q-G9FT]. 
 211. FDA Data, supra note 155, at Request Number 2013-5305. 
 212. FDA Data, supra note 155. 
 213. See, e.g., id. at Request Numbers 2013-5498, 2013-6463, 2013-6698. 
 214. See, e.g., id. at Request Numbers 2013-2264, 2013-3688, 2013-7277. “SBA” stands for 
“Summary Basis of Approval,” and includes the data that forms the basis for drug approval. See, 
e.g., Summary Basis of Approval, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Biologics
BloodVaccines/BloodBloodProducts/ApprovedProducts/NewDrugApplicationsNDAs/ucm0831
12.htm [http://perma.cc/7BRG-AXUU] (last updated May 21, 2012).  
 215. See, e.g., FDA Data, supra note 155, at Request Numbers 2013-1155, 2013-1676, 2013-
6461. “BLA” stands for “Biologics License Applications.” See Biologics License Applications 
(BLA) Process (CBER), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBlood
Vaccines/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/BiologicsLicenseApplicationsBLAProcess [http://
perma.cc/JNP5-W5SX] (last updated Nov. 5, 2015).  
 216. EAS CONSULTING GROUP, http://easconsultinggroup.com [http://perma.cc/MA4K-CZ
4E]. 
 217. FDA Data, supra note 155. 
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Research, a healthcare consulting services group,218 in its forty-four 
requests,219 presumably as part of their work for their clients. 
An entire subset of these commercial requesters does nothing 
but repeatedly request the agency’s own FOIA logs in small time 
increments; that is, the list of requests made or fulfilled in a given 
period of time (the same documents used to gather the data described 
in this Article). The law firm JH Barr & Associates LLC made 96 
requests, every one of which concerned FDA’s FOIA logs;220 Wolters 
Kluwer Law & Business likewise submitted 94 requests, all for FOIA 
logs;221 CanReg Inc., a regulatory consulting company,222 also 
submitted requests only for FOIA logs, numbering 90;223 The 
Dominion Group, “Healthcare Market Research Specialists,”224 
submitted 46 such requests;225 and FDA Review/FDAWebview, a 
daily FDA news service,226 made 43 of the same.227 
A final group of commercial requesters consist of personal injury 
law firms that specialize in product liability cases arising from 
pharmaceuticals. Andrews & Thornton, which “focuses its practice on 
the areas of serious injury cases resulting from dietary supplements 
and pharmaceuticals,” and is “a leader in the ephedra litigation,”228 
submitted fifty-nine requests.229 Most of its requests apparently 
concern metal-on-metal hip implants,230 including the premarket 
 
 218. FAVUS INSTITUTIONAL RES., http://favusinstitutionalresearch.com [http://perma.cc/LZ
5N-8ZDS].  
 219. FDA Data, supra note 155. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id.  
 222. CanReg Inc. appears to have merged into Optum, another regulatory consultant. See 
Optum (formerly CanReg Inc. & Chinagate), REG. AFF. PROFS. SOC’Y, http://www.raps.org/
network-community/regulatory-resource-directory/optuminsight [http://perma.cc/54T5-3MVR] 
(detailing the merger); Life Sciences, OPTUM, https://www.optum.com/life-sciences.html [http://
perma.cc/AW7T-5MU2] (describing Optum).  
 223. FDA Data, supra note 155. 
 224. THE DOMINION GROUP, http://www.thedominiongrp.com [http://perma.cc/8YCD-
356G] . 
 225. FDA Data, supra note 155. 
 226. About Us, FDAWEBVIEW, http://www.fdaweb.com/default.php?ea=aboutus [http://
perma.cc/6DPX-6RXJ].  
 227. FDA Data, supra note 155. 
 228. About Our Firm, ANDREWS & THORNTON, http://www.andrewsthornton.com/our-firm 
[http://perma.cc/FP6V-Y4F2].  
 229. FDA Data, supra note 155. 
 230. Id. 
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approval for various components231 and information concerning 
certain recalls.232 Metal-on-metal hip implants have come under 
scrutiny for various health risks.233 Unsurprisingly, Andrews & 
Thornton is investigating possible lawsuits and advertising to 
potential clients who might have those claims.234 Likewise, the firm of 
Andrus Wagstaff, PC submitted thirty requests apparently concerning 
products for which they had clients with personal injury claims.235 
In contrast to the dominant commercial interests represented in 
FDA FOIA requests, traditional news media plays a comparatively 
small role. Although the commercial requesters were not discussed in 
full, I provide a full accounting of every news media outlet or 
advocacy group dedicated to informing the public about government 
activities that submitted five or more requests in 2013: the Wall Street 
Journal submitted 45; Bloomberg News submitted 37; the Project on 
Government Oversight, a watchdog group, submitted 30; USA Today 
submitted 20; ProPublica submitted 17; the Associated Press 
submitted 15; the New York Times submitted 10; CBS News 
submitted 9 (one specifying 60 Minutes and another CBS Evening 
News); WSB-TV, a local Atlanta station, submitted 6; Scripps 
Howard News Service submitted 5; CNN submitted 5; MSNBC.com 
submitted 5; the Natural Resources Defense Council, an 
environmental advocacy group, submitted 5.236 The sum total of all of 
these media outlets’ requesting is 209 requests.237 
 
 231. See, e.g., id. at Request Numbers 2013-2495, 2013-2720, 2013-2733. The subject matter 
of the request is a number preceded by the letter “k,” which is a “510(k) number,” a unique 
control number assigned to each medical device premarket notification submission. 
510(k) Submission Process, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/Premarket
Notification510k/ucm070201.htm [http://perma.cc/F8Y4-UUTL] (last updated Apr. 6, 2015).  
 232. See, e.g., FDA Data, supra note 155, at Request Numbers 2013-2631, 2013-2632, 2013-
2634. 
 233. See Metal-on-Metal Hip Implants, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/ImplantsandProsthetics/MetalonMetalHip
Implants [http://perma.cc/Z4QP-YVZA] (last updated Apr. 10, 2015).  
 234. Stryker Hip, ANDREWS & THORNTON, http://www.andrewsthornton.com/current-
litigations/stryker-hip [http://perma.cc/6E7Y-GUMS].  
 235. FDA Data, supra note 155. For example, many of the requests apparently concern 
transvaginal mesh medical device implants. See FDA Data. The firm lists transvaginal mesh 
medical device implants as a practice area. Transvaginal Mesh, ANDRUS WAGSTAFF 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, https://www.andruswagstaff.com/transvaginal-mesh [http://perma.cc/VT
7H-YT53].  
 236. FDA Data, supra note 155. 
 237. Id.  
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C. Environmental Protection Agency 
The EPA received 9737 FOIA requests in 2013.238 Of those, 7736, 
or 79 percent, were submitted by commercial requesters.239 Because 
EPA aggregates media and educational requesters into one category, 
it is impossible to report a precise number of news media requests. 
But even if all of the requesters in this category were news media, 
they would constitute a tiny fraction of requesters. Together, news 
media and educational requesters submitted 344 requests, or 4 
percent of the total number. Requesters categorized as other than 
commercial, news media, or educational, submitted 1433, or 15 
percent of requests, and another 224 requests, or 2 percent, were 
uncategorized. 
As compared to other agencies, the top requesters at EPA 
submit fewer requests. Only six requesters submitted more than 100 
requests, and all were commercial requesters: ECC, Inc. submitted 
180; Hillman Consulting submitted 172; REPSG, Inc. submitted 170, 
EDR, Inc. submitted 160; Environmental Operations submitted 129, 
and Brinkerhoff Environmental Services, Inc. submitted 101.240 
Notably, nearly 900 requests designated as commercial do not have 
an organizational affiliation listed with the request. 
Among these top requesters is yet another apparent information 
reseller. EDR, Inc. is a company whose “mission is to continuously 
improve the ways that property stakeholders assess, transact and 
manage their real estate assets.”241 In its description of its history, 
EDR explains that it was founded after “a few environmental 
professionals saw a need for consulting firms to get their hands on 
comprehensive, accurate government records data—quickly.”242 
And mass data gathering, rather than targeted requesting, is 
evidenced in EDR’s FOIA requests to EPA. For example, EDR 
requested “Enforcement and violation data from the Office of 
Ground Water & Drinking Water’s Safe Drinking Water Information 
 
 238. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Freedom of Information Act Responses to June 8, 2015 
Requests by Margaret B. Kwoka (on file with author). The data covers calendar year 2013 and 
was compiled from responses to the June 8, 2015 request and from online data available at 
https://foiaonline.regulations.gov [hereinafter EPA Data]. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. For five of the six organizations, somewhere between one and three of their 
requests were uncategorized, but all other requests from all of the organizations were 
categorized as commercial. Id.  
 241. EDR, INC., http://edrnet.com [http://perma.cc/G6EW-GX4F].  
 242. The EDR Story, EDR, INC., http://edrnet.com/edr [http://perma/cc/3QH3-YDK3].  
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System” for all ten EPA regions between January 1, 2000 and 
September 30, 2012.243 Another request sought “Permit Compliance 
System and ICIS/NPDES Enforcement and Violation Data for all 10 
EPA Regions” between January 1, 2000 and June 30, 2012.244 Another 
sought all “Criminal Cases dealing with Air, Water, Toxics, [Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act], and [Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act] for all 10 
EPA regions.”245 A series of requests asked for region-by-region 
“Underground Storage Tank Site locations on Indian Land.”246 These 
are typical of the breadth of the requests submitted by EDR. 
In turn, EDR markets products that seem to incorporate these 
kinds of records. For example, geared toward environmental 
consultants, it provides “environmental compliance offerings,” which 
is a “comprehensive look at current government environmental 
filings” and includes “corporate liability and enforcement records,” 
“regulatory information . . . [on] waste management and disposal,” 
and other similar types of government records.247 Although EDR’s 
offerings are marketed in such a way that it is harder to discern 
precisely how each type of request feeds into its profit model, this 
evidence demonstrates that at least some core part of its business 
constitutes information reselling. 
EDR is not the only information reseller apparent in EPA’s 
FOIA logs. Although not one of the top requesters by volume at 
EPA, the FOIA Group, an information reseller that is discussed in 
detail below with respect to NIH, makes another significant 
appearance here with thirty-seven requests.248 
In contrast to EDR, other top commercial requesters appear to 
be consulting and due-diligence firms gathering information as part of 
their advising services for particular clients, not to warehouse 
information. Typically, the apparent purpose of the request is to aid 
in a Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (ESA). An ESA is 
 
 243. EPA Data, supra note 238, at Request Number EPA-HQ-2013-002738. 
 244. Id. at Request Number EPA-HQ-2013-002736. 
 245. Id. at Request Number EPA-HQ-2013-003319. 
 246. Id. at Request Numbers EPA-R4-2013-008495, EPA-R5-2013-008496, EPA-R5-2013-
008497, EPA-R6-2013-008498, EPA-R6-2013-008499, EPA-R7-2013-008500, EPA-R7-2013-
008501, EPA-R8-2013-008502, EPA-R8-2013-008503, EPA-R9-2013-008504, EPA-R9-2013-
008505, EPA-R10-2013-008507, EPA-R10-2013-008508. 
 247. Environmental Compliance Offerings, EDR, INC., http://edrnet.com/prods/
environmental-compliance-reports [http://perma.cc/X27E-9NQ9].  
 248. EPA Data, supra note 238. 
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essentially a due-diligence search about possible environmental 
hazards on commercial property, usually prepared before the sale or 
financing of the property that, under EPA rules, limits the liability of 
the purchaser if an eventual problem is uncovered.249 
For example, Environmental Consultants + Contractors Inc. 
(ECC Inc.) specifies in each of its requests a particular address about 
which it seeks records and explains that the records are sought 
because “ECC is currently performing a Phase I Environmental Site 
Assessment for the above-referenced location.”250 Likewise, Hillman 
Consulting, LLC’s requests all identify a particular property about 
which records are requested.251 Although Hillman does not specify the 
purpose of the request, it also provides Phase I ESA’s as part of their 
“Real Estate Due Diligence” services,252 and the requests are very 
likely to be on behalf of clients who have employed such services. The 
same is true for React Environmental Professional Services Group, 
Inc. (REPSG), which repeatedly requests “Water Quality 
Management, Water Supply & Community Health, Underground 
Storage Tank (UST) Records, Manifests, Environmental Cleanup 
Program, Solid Waste Management and Air Quality” about particular 
properties.253 On its website, REPSG specifies that its property 
assessment and investigation services include a government records 
search.254 Environmental Operations, which also requests about 
particular properties, also specifies that it is conducting a Phase I 
ESA in its requests.255 Many of Brinkerhoff Environmental Services, 
Inc.’s requests specify the same.256 
 
 249. General Brownfields Guidelines on All Appropriate Inquiries, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/brownfields/general-brownfields-guidelines-all-
appropriate-inquiries [http://perma.cc/VTK7-5MNE] (last updated Oct. 21, 2015).  
 250. E.g., EPA Data, supra note 238, at Request Number EPA-R3-2013-002557. ECC’s 180 
requests in the agency’s FOIA logs all contained this language with the exception of forty-six for 
which the EPA did not provide the text of the request because it was “under agency review.” 
EPA Data, supra note 238. 
 251. Id. Hillman’s requests in the agency’s FOIA logs all identified one or more properties 
with the exception of eight for which the EPA did not provide the text of the request because it 
was “under agency review.” Id.  
 252. Real Estate Due Diligence, HILLMAN CONSULTING LLC, http://hillmannconsulting.
com/services/real-estate-due-diligence [http://perma.cc/77GJ-LU8X].  
 253. EPA Data, supra note 238.  
 254. Overview: Property Assessment/Investigation, REACT ENVTL. PROF’L SERVS. GROUP, 
INC., http://www.repsg.com/services/property-assessment-investigation/#.Vnms4pMrJsM [http://
perma.cc/UAM2-SYTG].  
 255. EPA Data, supra note 238. Because the company submitted most of its requests as 
attachments to e-mails, descriptions of most requests are not present in the EPA’s FOIA logs. A 
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As for the news media requesters with more than 5 requests, 
MuckRock News,257 a site that publishes records obtained through 
public records requests, led with 33 requests; EnergyWire/E&E 
Publishing, an online news site for environmental and energy news 
matters, followed with 17 requests; then Environmental Integrity 
Project, a watchdog group, with 14; the Center for Investigative 
Reporting with 12; the Associated Press with 12; Reuters with 10; the 
Washington Examiner with 9; The Hill with 9; the Huffington Post 
with 9; ProPublica with 8; Junkscience.com with 7; and the Wall Street 
Journal with 6.258 
D. Defense Logistics Agency 
The DLA also runs a midsized FOIA operation. In 2013, DLA 
received a total of 4420 FOIA requests, a bit less than half as many as 
FDA, SEC, or EPA, but still four times as many as NIH or FTC.259 Of 
those, however, a staggering 4226, or 96 percent, of all requests made 
were classified as commercial requests.260 Only forty-one requests, 
representing just under 1 percent of all requests, came from the news 
media; all other requests numbered 153, almost all of which came 
from private individuals.261 
Interestingly, yet again, a prominent requester is an information 
reseller. Day & Day, Inc., whose 224 requests to DLA in 2013 made it 
the second-highest requester by volume, holds itself out as 
“provid[ing] experienced insight into the Defense Logistics Agency 
Marketplace,” and “enabling [clients] to seize contract 
 
random sample of ten of the attached request letters is available online, though all made 
reference to a Phase I ESA. Id. These letters are available via http://foiaonline.regulations.gov 
by clicking “Search FOIA Requests,” selecting the EPA, and typing in the desired request 
number. 
 256. Id.  
 257. MUCKROCK, https://www.muckrock.com [http://perma.cc/RS2A-3N3X]. 
 258. EPA Data, supra note 238. This list omits requesters who appear to be educational 
rather than news media entities, though EPA categorizes them together. Those requesters are 
Oberlin College and the University of Alberta. Id. 
 259. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Def. Logistics Agency, Freedom of Information Act Responses to 
Oct. 6, 2014, Feb. 12, 2015, Feb. 13, 2015 and Apr. 21, 2015 Requests by Margaret B. Kwoka (on 
file with author) [hereinafter DLA Data]. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id.  
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opportunities.”262 Day & Day, like other requesters, requests almost 
entirely information about awarded contracts and bids for contracts.263 
In turn, Day & Day provides a variety of services to DLA 
contractors, most of which constitute information reselling. Its 
flagship service is access to an online database of DLA procurements, 
contracts, and contractors, which is searchable by contract number, 
solicitation number, and purchase request number, among other 
methods.264 It advertises that this database constitutes “the most 
comprehensive collection of cross-referenced information” in this 
area.265 A monthly subscription for a single user to access the database 
is $175, while an annual subscription runs $1,800.266 Alternatively, the 
database can be accessed for a per-minute price of $0.95.267 This 
database consists of precisely the information Day & Day requests 
under FOIA from DLA.268 
Another service Day & Day offers is the production of 
competitive pricing reports, which constitute abstracts and second-
and third-lowest bidder prices for an awarded contract, to see how 
competitive the pricing was on a finalized contract.269 Bid abstracts are 
a frequent subject of Day & Day FOIA requests.270 Day & Day sells 
each competitive pricing report for $40.271 Separately, Day & Day 
markets a bid-notification service.272 One of the ways in which Day & 
Day claims the notification has particularly high value is that Day & 
Day maintains over thirty years of DLA-contract award history 
against which to measure the bid information,273 much of that 
information presumably coming from its database. Subscription 
 
 262. DAY & DAY, INC., http://www.dayandday.com [http://perma.cc/CL62-3VEC]. 
 263. See, e.g., DLA Data, supra note 259, at Request Letters DSCP-13-PFOI-00639, DSCP-
13-PFOI-00254, DSCP-13-PFOI-00545, DSCP-13-PFOI-00723, DSCR-13-RFOI-00413, DSCR-
14-RFOI-00001, DSCR-14-RFOI-00019, DSCR-13-RFOI-00964. 
 264. Online Database, DAY & DAY, INC., http://www.dayandday.com/dla-database.html 
[http://perma.cc/QJ5D-P74X]. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Defense Procurement Services Pricing, DAY & DAY, INC., http://www.dayandday.com/
dla-servicespricing.html [http://perma.cc/8QJ5-TLDV]. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See DLA Data, supra note 259. 
 269. DLA Report, DAY & DAY, INC., http://www.dayandday.com/dla-reports.html [http://
perma.cc/SNT4-SVY4].  
 270. See DLA Data, supra note 259. 
 271. Defense Procurement Services Pricing, DAY & DAY, INC., supra note 266. 
 272. DLA Bid Notification, DAY & DAY, INC., http://www.dayandday.com/dla-bidservices.
html [http://perma.cc/X45F-5RBL]. 
 273. Id.  
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pricing for the bid-notification service is identical to the database 
pricing, though subscribing to both services together comes at a 
discount.274 Finally, Day & Day also offers a value-added consulting 
service, based on its specialized expertise, in which it will represent a 
contractor seeking to be awarded a contract through the bid 
process.275 
Day & Day is not the only information reseller present within 
the list of frequent DLA requesters. The FOIA Group, which 
primarily requests as a paid service on behalf of clients and is chief 
among the commercial requesters at NIH, makes a significant 
appearance here as well.276 It submitted forty-six requests in 2013.277 
Aside from information resellers, however, other commercial 
interests still dominate the DLA requesting landscape, and there are 
vast numbers of repeat players among them. In fact, there are ten 
businesses with over 100 requests in 2013 to the DLA.278 The other 
frequent requesters, however, are businesses that regularly contract 
to provide goods and services to DLA.279 For example, Polytechnic 
Industries, Inc., which made 246 requests in 2013 (the highest number 
of any single requester),280 manufactures a wide variety of products 
that it sells to the U.S. military (and others),281 including gears, 
rotating components, sheet metal, and electronics.282 JGB Enterprises, 
Inc., with 221 requests in 2013,283 specializes in the manufacturing of 
hydraulic hoses and hose assemblies,284 and boasts that “[o]ver 5,000 
 
 274. Defense Procurement Services Pricing, supra note 266.  
 275. Manufacturer’s Representation Services, DAY & DAY, INC., http://www.dayandday.com/
manufacturer-representation.html [http://perma.cc/2KY2-PZL5]. 
 276. For a detailed description of the FOIA Group, see infra notes 343–53 and 
accompanying text. 
 277. DLA Data, supra note 259. 
 278. Id.  
 279. They are, in descending order, Polytechnic Industries, Inc. (246 requests), JGB 
Enterprises, Inc. (221 requests), BEC Machine Products (208 requests), Dircksen & Associates, 
Inc. (189 requests), Specialized Metals (159 requests), Midwest Tube Fabricators, Inc. (143 
requests), Centroid, Inc. (135 requests), Milwaukee Valve Company (122 requests), Brighton 
Cromwell, LLC (112 requests), and Allfast Fastening Systems, Inc. (105 requests). Id. 
 280. Id.  
 281. About Us, POLYTECHNIC INDUSTRIES, INC., http://www.polytechnicind.com/index_
files/Page366.htm [http://perma.cc/Q7RC-FEDF]. 
 282. Just A Sampling Of Our Manufacturing Capabilities, POLYTECHNIC INDUSTRIES, INC., 
http://www.polytechnicind.com/index_files/Page481.htm [http://perma.cc/XVQ4-TJW8]. 
 283. DLA Data, supra note 259. 
 284. Company Overview and History, JGB ENTERPRISES, INC., http://jgbhose.com/base_
pages/overview.asp [http://perma.cc/9MWL-7P6J]. 
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military contracts pass through our doors annually.”285 Another, BEC 
Machine Products, which filed 208 requests in 2013, “produce[s] 
precision machine parts for military systems,” and advertises its 
fulfillment of Department of Defense contracts.286 
Universally, these requests, like the information resellers’ 
requests, are for awarded contracts, bids, and abstracts pertaining to 
contracts.287 For example, Polytechnic Industries regularly requested 
“the ABVS summary data information (or bid abstract)” for 
particular contracts.288 JGB Enterprises, Inc., for its part, regularly 
requested “an abstract of bids received for” contracts that JGB 
Enterprises, Inc. itself was eventually awarded.289 
The news media are almost absent from the list of requesters. 
The only significant repeat player was Scripps Howard News Service, 
a wire service that distributed syndicated stories,290 which submitted 
17 requests.291 The remaining news media outlets submitted only 
occasional requests: MuckRock News, described above, submitted 5; 
The Nation, a progressive magazine, submitted 3; Federal 
Practitioner, a peer-reviewed journal for health care practitioners, 
submitted 4; Stars and Stripes, a military magazine, submitted 2; The 
Associated Press submitted 2; and a handful of other media outlets 
each submitted 1.292 
E. Federal Trade Commission 
The FTC processes a relatively small but still significant number 
of FOIA requests each year. In 2013, it received 1538 total FOIA 
 
 285. Welcome to Military Supplier, JGB ENTERPRISES, INC., http://www.militarysupplier.
com [http://perma.cc/3LE3-NM7T].  
 286. BEC MACHINE PRODS., http://becmachine.com/index.htm [http://perma.cc/Q424-LN
US].  
 287. DLA Data, supra note 259. 
 288. See, e.g., id. at Request Letters DSCR-13-RFOI 13-00874, DSCR-13-RFOI 13-00468; 
DSCR-13-RFOI 13-00616. 
 289. See, e.g., id. at Request Letters DSCR-13-RFOI 13-00286, DSCR-13-RFOI 13-00364, 
DSCR-13-RFOI 13-00619. 
 290. Its wire service is now closed down. Nick Turner, Scripps Howard News Service Will 
Close Down After 96 Years, BLOOMBERG (NOV. 13, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2013-11-13/scripps-howard-news-service-will-cease-operation-after-96-years [http://
perma.cc/DRY5-ANEJ].  
 291. DLA Data, supra note 259. 
 292. Id. The others included ABC 7 Chicago, WISN TV 12, Center for Effective 
Government, The Hill, Associated Press, Tribune Review, Salt Lake Tribune, and Judicial 
Watch. Id.  
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requests.293 Of that, 34 percent, or 528 requests, were commercial 
requests.294 Because FTC breaks down the categories of its requesters 
into more specific designations than the statutory fee categories, it is 
possible to disaggregate that number further.295 Of all commercial 
requests, 232, or 15 percent of total requests, were from businesses, 
and 296, or 19 percent, were from law firms.296 News media requests 
made up 14 percent, or 219, of total requests.297 And all other 
requests, which numbered 791, constituted 52 percent.298 
The highest-volume commercial requester was the Direct Selling 
Association (DSA),299 a national trade association for companies that 
engage in direct sales to consumers,300 such as their more prominent 
members Amway and Mary Kay.301 In 2013, DSA submitted eighty-
three requests. Of those, forty-six pertained to current full members 
of DSA, and another eleven pertained to pending DSA applicants for 
membership.302 Although the remaining twenty-six requests pertained 
 
 293. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Freedom of Information Act Responses to Sept. 29, 2014, Feb. 12, 
2015, Feb. 13, 2015 and Apr. 21, 2015 Requests by Margaret B. Kwoka (on file with author) 
[hereinafter FTC Data]. 
 294. Id. This number is a combination of what FTC reports as “Commercial Organization” 
and what it reports as “Law Firm” in their requester categories. In conversation with the FTC 
FOIA staff, it was represented that Law Firms are designated in the fee category of whoever 
their client is; that is, if the client is an individual they will be categorized as “other,” and if the 
client is a business they will be designated as “Commercial Organization.” However, an FTC 
FOIA staff member was candid that mostly Law Firms end up subject to the commercial 
requester fee category, and it was comparatively rare for Law Firms to be designated as an 
“other” requester. Telephone Interview with Anna Murray, Att’y, Office of Gen. Counsel, FTC 
(Mar. 13, 2015).  
 295. The categories it reports are Commercial Organization, Consumer Group, 
Educational/Non-scientific, Federal Government, State/Local Agency, Private Individuals, Law 
Firm, and News Media. FTC Data, supra note 293.  
 296. Id.  
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. In the database, FTC lists the name of the individual who signed the request, in this 
case, John Webb, rather than the organization. John Webb’s position as associate legal counsel 
for the DSA is confirmed by the organization’s website. See DSA Staff Directory, DIRECT 
SELLING ASS’N, http://www.dsa.org/forms/StaffDirectoryPublic/viewRoster [http://perma.cc/GB
7E-FS8A]. 
 300. About, DIRECT SELLING ASS’N, http://www.dsa.org/about [http://perma.cc/QYQ2-N3
GS]. 
 301. Direct Selling Association Membership Directory Search Results, DIRECT SELLING 
ASS’N, http://www.dsa.org/forms/CompanyFormPublicMembers/search?action=find [http://
perma.cc/CW9A-5HFV]. 
 302. FTC Data, supra note 293. These statuses were ascertained at the time of writing, not 
the time of request, by checking against the DSA membership database. See Direct Selling 
Member Organization Search, DIRECT SELLING ASS’N, http://www.dsa.org/forms/Company
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to companies whose affiliation with DSA was not able to be 
confirmed, because these requests were in 2013 it is likely that these 
companies were applicants or members at the time, but are no longer 
affiliated or doing business in the industry.303 
Despite its nonprofit status, DSA’s revenue-generating interest 
in checking into the FTC records of its members and applicants is 
evident from its membership process. As DSA advertises, there is a 
one-year review process for applicants during which their application 
is pending. During this time, DSA reviews the applicant’s business 
practices, based on the company’s own materials, as well as DSA’s 
“requests [for] information from various sources.”304 And review is 
not just a one-time occurrence. DSA randomly reviews 20 percent of 
its membership each year on an ongoing basis to ensure compliance 
with DSA standards.305 DSA’s requests to FTC about its own 
members and applicants are made to facilitate this review process.306 
The DSA review is marketed as providing value to the 
prospective member: “The review process creates an opportunity for 
our staff to advise on areas where companies may not meet the 
standards expected by state and federal regulators.”307 Importantly, 
DSA derives considerable revenue from membership. Depending on 
the annual net sales of the member, dues can range from $1,600 per 
year for a company that is not yet doing business to more than 
$100,000 for businesses exceeding $500 million of sales a year.308 In 
 
FormPublicMembers [http://perma.cc/4NJT-3XUK]. Individual request letters confirm this 
purpose. See, e.g., FTC Data, supra note 293, at Request Letters FOIA-2014-00239, FOIA-2013-
00801. 
 303. A sampling of the request letters reveals that for at least the few that were examined, 
this is indeed the case. See, e.g., FTC Data, supra note 293, at Request Letters FOIA-2013-
00350, FOIA-2013-00351, FOIA-2013-01129.  
 304. Pending Applicant FAQs, DIRECT SELLING ASS’N, http://www.dsa.org/benefits/
member/faqs [http://perma.cc/6AZX-3XKD] (click “How long does it take to become a member 
of DSA?”).  
 305. Id. 
 306. See, e.g., FTC Data, supra note 293, at Request Letters FOIA-2014-00293, FOIA-2013-
00801, FOIA-2013-00350, FOIA-2013-00351, FOIA-2013-01129 (“As part of our continuing 
efforts to promote the highest ethical standards within the direct selling community, DSA is in 
the process of reviewing all member companies. We seek information from various business and 
regulatory entities.”).  
 307. Pending Applicant FAQs, supra note 304. 
 308. In fact, for each net sales bracket, there is a flat fee plus a percentage of all sales 
beyond the minimum amount in the bracket, and thus, there is no cap on the maximum amount 
of dues a company could owe. DIRECT SELLING ASS’N, DSA ANNUAL DUES 1–2, http://www.
dsa.org/docs/default-source/member-resources/2016-renewal/dues-calculation.pdf?sfvrsn=10 
[http://perma.cc/9G4H-7T8R]. 
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turn, DSA provides a variety of member benefits including public 
relations, lobbying,309 and representing the interests of direct sellers 
(and multilevel marketing companies) before federal agencies, 
including the FTC.310 
One significant repeat-requester, which submits the third largest 
volume of requests (numbering twenty-four), is an investment 
research firm, Height Analytics.311 Height’s requests concern a 
number of liberal consumers groups, such as the National Association 
of Consumer Advocates, Public Citizen, U.S. PIRG, and the 
Consumers Union, as well as a number of the most prominent 
Latina/o political and advocacy organizations, such as National 
Council of La Raza, Congressional Hispanic Caucus, and the 
Hispanic Federation.312 Height also requested information about 
Elizabeth Warren.313 A sampling of these request letters reveals a 
pattern of asking for all communications, including meetings, visitor 
logs, and appointments between the FTC and each individual or 
entity named.314 Height, in turn, markets its research-consulting 
services as its primary product, including by addressing “regulatory 
and policy topics to corporate boards, industry associations, 
conferences or universities.”315 In fact, it distinguishes itself by “going 
beyond conventional financial modeling and sector coverage” to 
include “regulatory, macroeconomic and geopolitical risks that 
 
 309. DSA describes its advocacy and lobbying role thusly:  
We advocate on behalf of our member companies and the sales channel. We lobby, 
testify and monitor legislation at the local, state and federal levels. We also offer legal 
advice and marketing plan reviews during the membership application process and 
random reviews of members to make sure each company starts and continues 
standing by the best standards in our Code of Ethics. 
Benefits: Overview, DIRECT SELLING ASS’N, http://www.dsa.org/benefits/member/overview 
[http://perma.cc/GV2S-5YZY]. 
 310. See Karen E. Klein, How Direct Sellers Dodged FTC Regulation, BLOOMBERG BUS. 
(Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-04-16/the-multibillion-dollar-
direct-selling-industry-dodges-the-ftc#p1 [http://perma.cc/7ASX-U85C]. 
 311. FTC Data, supra note 293. The requester’s name is Christine Muchanic, who works at 
Height Analytics. See id. at Request Letters FOIA-2013-00918, FOIA-2013-00913, FOIA-2013-
00922, FOIA-2013-00916 (affiliating Christine Muchanic with Height Analytics).  
 312. FTC Data, supra note 293.  
 313. Id. 
 314. See id. at Request Letters FOIA-2013-00918 (Public Citizen), FOIA-2013-00913 
(Elizabeth Warren), FOIA-2013-00922 (National Council of La Raza), FOIA-2013-00916 
(Direct Selling Association).  
 315. Our Services, HEIGHT SECURITIES LLC, http://www.heightllc.com/our-services [http://
perma.cc/H48B-68KA]. 
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impact investments and corporate operating environments.”316 Its 
FOIA requests most likely are made as part of its research, which of 
course is a sort of value-added consulting model based, in part, on the 
information it receives. 
Lawyers are also significant commercial requesters at FTC. For 
instance, the second-largest commercial requester, at seventy 
requests,317 is a lawyer at the firm Bryan Cave who specializes in data 
privacy and data security regulations, and “assist[s] clients in 
responding to investigations conducted by the FTC.”318 Twenty-three 
of those requests were for the FTC’s FOIA logs or prior FOIA 
request letters.319 Other requests mostly concern particular companies 
or sets of particular consumer complaints.320 Two other lawyers at 
Bryan Cave also submitted significant numbers of requests: one is the 
“leader of the firm’s global data privacy and security practice” and 
“advis[es] clients on how to comply with state and federal privacy, 
security and advertising laws, representing clients before the Federal 
Trade Commission, and defending national class actions,” (eighteen 
requests);321 the other “defends individuals and corporations under 
investigation by government agencies, including the Federal Trade 
Commission,” (eight requests).322 Those requests were likewise mostly 
about a particular company or set of particular consumer 
complaints.323 Other repeat commercial requesters, though much 
smaller in volume, included investment management firms,324 a 
political action committee,325 and a regulated business.326 
 
 316. The Firm, HEIGHT SECURITIES LLC, http://www.heightllc.com/the-firm [http://perma.
cc/4Q39-TZN9].  
 317. FTC Data, supra note 293.  
 318. Joshua A. James, BRYAN CAVE, http://www.bryancave.com/joshjames [http://perma.cc/
HL6B-YATL]. 
 319. FTC Data, supra note 293.  
 320. Id.; see, e.g., id. at Request Letters FOIA-2013-01040 (requesting consumer complaints 
about a long list of companies), FOIA-2013-01302 (requesting consumer complaints regarding 
one particular company, Ceridian Corp.). 
 321. See FTC Data, supra note 293; David A. Zetoony, BRYAN CAVE, http://www.bryan
cave.com/davidzetoony [http://perma.cc/4LLN-EQ2H].  
 322. See FTC Data, supra note 293; Kristin Robinson, BRYAN CAVE, http://www.bryancave.
com/kristinrobinson [http://perma.cc/NDQ3-NHLX].  
 323. FTC Data, supra note 293.  
 324. Soros Fund Management LLC submitted six requests. Id. (showing six requests from 
Marshall Levine); id. at Request Number FOIA-2014-00034 (showing a request letter from 
Marshall Levine submitted on behalf of Soros Fund Management LLC). Apex Capital Holdings 
LLC submitted seven requests. Id. (showing seven requests from Michael Samuels); id. at 
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News media requesters play a somewhat more prominent role at 
the FTC, but no news source dominates. A reporter at the Center for 
Investigative Reporting was the single biggest media requester, at 12 
requests.327 A “regulatory journalist” at the Policy and Regulatory 
Report (PaRR), was the runner-up with 10 requests.328 A journalist at 
the New York Post submitted 7;329 one for Politico submitted 6;330 one 
for @thehill, a Twitter feed for policy and political news, submitted 
5;331 one for MLex, a wire service on antitrust and regulatory risk, 
submitted 5;332 one who operates a website dedicated to exposing 
government secrets called The Black Vault submitted 5;333 a freelance 
journalist submitted 5;334 and all other journalists submitted fewer 
than 5 requests each.335 Consumer groups play a small role, but some 
are repeat players: for example, Truth In Advertising Inc. (TINA.org) 
submitted 12 requests;336 and MuckRock, described above, submitted 
 
Request Number FOIA-2014-00019 (showing a request letter from Michael Samuels submitted 
on behalf of Apex Capital Holdings LLC).  
 325. American Bridge 21st Century submitted five requests. FTC Data, supra note 293 
(showing five requests from Abraham Payton); id. at Request Letter FOIA-2013-00330 
(showing a request letter from Abraham Payton submitted on behalf of American Bridge 21st 
Century).  
 326. CallerID4U appears to have submitted six requests. FTC Data, supra note 293 
(showing six requests by Viviana Ramirez); id. at Request Letter FOIA-2013-00690 (showing a 
request letter from Viviana Ramirez that is signed by “CallerID4U”). 
 327. See FTC Data, supra note 293; Matt Drange, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING, 
http://cironline.org/person/matt-drange [http://perma.cc/2SD6-7SSM]. 
 328. See FTC Data, supra note 293; Our Global Network, POL’Y & REG. REP., http://www.
parr-global.com/our-global-network [http://perma.cc/Q5CQ-MCTU] (listing Ryan Lynch as a 
Regulatory Journalist). 
 329. See FTC Data, supra note 293; Michelle Celarier, N.Y. POST, http://nypost.com/author/
michelle-celarier [http://perma.cc/MM8D-KB22].  
 330. See FTC Data, supra note 293; Conor Skelding, POLITICOBETA, http://www.capital
newyork.com/users/conor-skelding [http://perma.cc/5V8T-B5HG]. 
 331. See FTC Data, supra note 293; Megan R. Wilson, MUCK RACK, http://muckrack.com/
megan-r-wilson [http://perma.cc/A8FU-UBDP]; Megan R. Wilson, THE HILL, http://thehill.com/
author/megan-r-wilson [http://perma.cc/JGU5-WU7Y]. 
 332. See FTC Data, supra note 293; Leah Nylen, MLEX, http://mlexmarketinsight.com/leah-
nylen [http://perma.cc/GP79-GQGA].  
 333. See FTC Data, supra note 293; John Greenewald, COAST TO COAST AM, http://www.
coasttocoastam.com/guest/greenewald-john/5909 [http://perma.cc/6RA2-BKJY]; THE BLACK 
VAULT, http://www.theblackvault.com [http://perma.cc/T2HL-W7QQ].  
 334. See FTC Data, supra note 293; ZACK SAMPSON, http://zacksampson.com [http://perma.
cc/FJX4-SVKR].  
 335. FTC Data, supra note 293.  
 336. See id.; Fran Silverman, TRUTH IN ADVERTISING, INC., https://www.truthinadvertising.
org/author/fsilverman [http://perma.cc/6746-NC65]. 
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10.337 FTC also has a particularly large volume of individual 
requesters, nearly all of whom are requesting copies of files about 
their own consumer complaints to the FTC.338 These number 401 of 
the total 712 individual requests made.339 
F. National Institutes of Health 
The NIH has a relatively small, but not negligible, volume of 
requests: in 2013, it received a total of 1198 requests.340 Of those, 436, 
or 36 percent were submitted by commercial requesters; 177, or 15 
percent, were submitted by requesters who were designated as 
educational institutions; 62, or 5 percent, were submitted by 
requesters with news media status; and the remaining 523, which 
represents 45 percent, were submitted by other requesters.341 
Of the commercial requesters, a pure information reseller again 
leads the pack for volume of requests.342 The FOIA Group 
(mentioned above), a corporation established in 1988,343 submitted 
twenty-five requests in 2013, each of which pertains to a particular 
NIH contract and related documents.344 The FOIA Group’s primary 
service is a requesting service, in which it will submit the FOIA 
request for the client, negotiate with the agency, and, if necessary, 
appeal a denial.345 Prime amongst the reasons the FOIA Group 
 
 337. See FTC Data, supra note 293; FTC Complaints for www.yelp.com, MUCKROCK, 
https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/ftc-complaints-for-wwwyelpcom-16
45 [http://perma.cc/WJ74-JK6V] (demonstrating that Robert Delaware requests for 
MuckRock).  
 338. FTC Data, supra note 293. The names of these individual requesters were redacted 
from the records under FOIA exemption 6. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2012). Because these 
requests concern individuals’ own complaints, it seems unlikely that there are many repeat 
players among them, but it is unknown as their identities were not released.  
 339. FTC Data, supra note 293.  
 340. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Nat’l Institutes of Health, Freedom of 
Information Act Responses to Sept. 29, 2014, Feb. 12, 2013, and Feb. 13, 2015 Requests by 
Margaret B. Kwoka (on file with author) [hereinafter NIH Data].  
 341. Id. 
 342. There are also thirty-one individual requesters whose requests were designated as 
commercial. Id. However, NIH redacted the names of individual requesters, and thus, it is not 
possible to ascertain the nature of their commercial interest. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that 
all of those individual requests are from the same individual requester, though there is no way 
to know.  
 343. About FGI, FOIA GROUP, INC., http://www.foia.com/aboutfgi.asp [http://perma.cc/
2B58-L85X]. 
 344. NIH Data, supra note 340. 
 345. FOIA Services, FOIA GROUP, INC., http://www.foia.com/info_services.asp [http://
perma.cc/9XNA-UXNG]. 
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advertises for using their services, is that “[t]he identity of our client is 
never revealed to any government agency, contractor or other 
entity.”346 It also claims that its “reputation for being ‘very aggressive’ 
under the law . . . brings results for our customers that other vendors 
can’t compare [sic].”347 For this service, the FOIA Group charges 
from $95 per request and up.348 
Most relevant to NIH, one of the specialized services that the 
FOIA Group offers is the maintenance of a library of government 
contracts, winning proposals, and labor rates, which it advertises were 
all “secured under the Freedom of Information Act.”349 A customer 
can therefore simply purchase these documents, requested by and 
kept in a database by the FOIA Group, at a cost that varies per 
document.350 Because the FOIA Group’s NIH requesting pertains to 
government contracts, it appears that the records it obtains from NIH 
are used as the raw material for the database product it offers. 
Perhaps most striking, and unique, about the FOIA Group are 
the other services it offers in conjunction with these information and 
requesting services. Until very recently, it marketed what it called, 
“Agency FOIA Redaction & Support Services,” a set of services it 
offered to contract to perform for the agencies themselves in 
administering FOIA.351 Among the services it provided to agencies 
were “request intake [and] internal tracking . . . ; preparation of all 
relevant correspondence; . . . coordination with FOIA requester for 
issues concerning document releaseability [sic], fees, or other items; 
responsive document review, screening and redaction; [and] . . . 
application of FOIA Exemptions.”352 That is, at one time, the FOIA 
Group both helped companies to request information under FOIA 
and also helped agencies respond to requests for information under 
FOIA.353 Presumably the FOIA Group had some internal process for 
 
 346. Id. (additional emphasis added).  
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. 
 349. FOIACON Library & Databases, FOIA GROUP, INC., http://www.foia.com/library_db.
asp [http://perma.cc/VXU3-LCBL]. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Agency FOIA Redaction & Support Services, FOIA GROUP, INC., http://www.foia.com/
Suppt.asp [http://perma.cc/L3KT-JJQC]. As of February 2016, this service is no long listed on an 
updated website. 
 352. Id.  
 353. See Christopher Lee, On FOIA Front, More Agencies Contract Out: Private Firms Have 
Growing Role in Handling Backlogs of Requests for Government Records, WASH. POST (June 8, 
2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23282-2004Jun7.html [https://perma.cc/ 
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ensuring no conflict of interest on any given request or service 
provided to an agency, but the tension in its positions on a macro 
level is almost undeniable. 
The FOIA Group is not the only information reseller requesting 
at NIH. Interestingly, FOI Services Inc., though it markets itself as 
specializing in FDA requesting,354 makes an appearance here, having 
submitted six requests to NIH.355 Five of those requests were related 
to grant applications and the last of which was for emails about 
funded research concerning Bisphenol A, a request that apparently 
originated with FDA but that was subsequently referred to NIH.356 
The third largest requester at NIH designated as commercial, 
with twenty requests, is the National Disease Research Interchange 
(NDRI), which is actually a nonprofit organization that supplies 
human tissues and organs to scientists for use in research.357 Although 
it is a nonprofit, NDRI does charge fees to researchers to cover the 
costs of its services,358 and has separate fee arrangements for biotech 
and pharmaceutical companies that use its services.359 Thus, NDRI 
certainly has some financial interest in marketing its wares to 
academic researchers and industry alike. Consistent with that interest, 
NDRI’s FOIA requests to NIH all concern obtaining contact 
information for various research grantees,360 presumably so they can, 
in turn, contact the researchers about the services they offer. 
Other repeat commercial requesters also seem to use FOIA for 
monetary gain. The Principal Investigators Association (PIA), for 
instance, made ten requests in 2013, all for particular grants and 
 
WL78-32H9] (“FOIA Group Inc., a 16-year-old D.C.-based company that helps businesses and 
nonprofits submit FOIA requests, plans to diversify by moving into processing such requests for 
agencies, said Jeff Stachewicz, a founder of the firm.”).  
 354. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text (discussing FOI Services, Inc. in more 
detail). 
 355. NIH Data, supra note 340. 
 356. Id.  
 357. About NDRI, NAT’L DISEASE RES. INST., http://ndriresource.org/About-NDRI/18 
[http://perma.cc/3RPV-EWPQ].  
 358. Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L DISEASE RES. INST., http://ndriresource.org/
Frequently-Asked-Questions/103 [http://perma.cc/L83F-LLAC].  
 359. Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Industry Researchers, NAT’L DISEASE RES. INST., 
http://ndriresource.org/Researcher-Services/Biotech-Pharmaceutical/104 [http://perma.cc/8Z
YN-8WSK]. NDRI boasts that it annually provides “over 10,000 human organs and tissues to 
researchers in dozens of the USA’s major pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, 
providing critical support for many target discovery and validation and drug discovery and 
development projects.” Id.  
 360. NIH Data, supra note 340.  
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related materials.361 In turn, PIA’s primary activity is creating and 
selling materials to help researchers obtain funding.362 For example, 
PIA publishes a series of guides, sold for between $149 and $349 each, 
that give detailed advice about submitting NIH grant proposals of 
different kinds.363 These guides seem to draw, at least in part, on 
successful proposals as examples. For instance, one such guide 
includes “detailed examples specific to each type” of the target grant 
as well as “directly quoted information from successful . . . grant 
applications.”364 It seems highly likely that PIA is using the grants it 
requests from NIH to assist in the development of these types of 
manuals, training materials, webinars, and other primary functions of 
the organization.365 And like with other agencies, law firms also play a 
role in commercial requesting, presumably on behalf of, or to serve 
the interests of, their clients.366 
Of noncommercial requesters at NIH, animal rights 
organizations and educational institutions dominate the landscape. 
On the animal-advocacy side, the largest players were In Defense of 
Animals, which made 31 requests; People for the Ethical Treatment 
of Animals (PETA), which made 25; the New England Anti-
Vivisection Society (NEAVS), which made 13; and Stop Animal 
Exploitation Now (SAEN), which made 9.367 As for educational 
institutions, which primarily would have an interest in NIH activities 
for research purposes, the highest-volume examples include George 
Mason University with its 15 requests, University of California, San 
Francisco with its 15 requests, and the University of Florida with its 
13 requests.368 
By contrast, organizations that are dedicated to government 
accountability and public oversight have a presence, albeit smaller: 
 
 361. Id.  
 362. See Our Mission, PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS ASS’N, http://principalinvestigators.org/
about-us/our-mission [http://perma.cc/987L-2CN8]. 
 363. See, e.g., NIH R01 Grant Application Mentor, PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS ASS’N, 
https://principalinvestigators.org/product/nih-r01-grant-application-mentor [http://perma.cc/
D4J2-RPH2]. 
 364. R24 Grants, PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS ASS’N, https://principalinvestigators.org/
product/r24-grants-guide [http://perma.cc/BKE3-2QVT] (emphasis omitted).  
 365. For a full list of PIA’s activities, see PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS ASS’N, https://
principalinvestigators.org [http://perma.cc/UJ2D-UEF2]. 
 366. For example, the O’Neal Firm submitted seven requests, Sidley Austin submitted seven 
requests, and the Metier Law Firm submitted six requests. NIH Data, supra note 340.  
 367. Id.  
 368. Id. 
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MuckRock News, described above, made 14 requests; Public Citizen, 
an advocacy group, made 12 requests; and the Center for Public 
Integrity made 3 requests.369 Traditional news media organizations are 
nearly absent: the Associated Press made 3 requests, USA Today 
made 1 request, the Baltimore Sun made 1 request, ProPublica made 
1 request, and ABC News made 1 request.370 
III.  PRIVATIZING FOIA 
The sheer volume of commercial FOIA requesting suggests that, 
at least at a significant subset of agencies, FOIA is working for this 
constituency in a way that it is not for its principal intended user, the 
news media. In some ways, regulated industry’s advantage in FOIA 
requesting is akin to its documented advantages in other 
administrative processes, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking.371 
These advantages stem both from the resources of business interests, 
but also from their insider status as a repeat player to the process.372 
Without doubt, commercial uses of FOIA serve a large range of 
purposes. Some may squarely advance FOIA’s intended goal; for 
example, a company might seek information on the agency’s use of its 
enforcement authority so as to better lobby Congress for change, 
advocate for different regulatory structures at the agency level, or 
otherwise publicize its opinions on agency activities. However, the 
FOIA requests described in Part II demonstrate that most 
commercial uses are not within FOIA’s bailiwick. Researching 
competitors’ business ventures about which an agency happens to 
have information,373 uncovering regulatory risks to better advise 
investors,374 or simply using FOIA to find out what others are learning 
about you375 neither enhance agency oversight nor promote 
 
 369. Id.  
 370. Id. 
 371. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making 
of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 68–82 (2013) (documenting the outsized role of the 
financial industry in the consideration of the so-called Volcker Rule).  
 372. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC. REV. 95 (1974) (documenting advantages repeat players 
reap in the legal system).  
 373. See, e.g., supra note 194 and accompanying text (describing the activities of Thomson 
Reuters as, in part, providing intelligence on industry competitors).  
 374. See, e.g., supra notes 315–16 and accompanying text (describing the activities of Height 
Analytics). 
 375. See, e.g., supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text (describing the FOIA requesting 
patterns of Merck).  
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democratic participation in governance. Moreover, this research 
identifies a surprisingly prominent set of commercial requesters 
whose FOIA activities are even further from serving its aim: 
information resellers who request, at a high volume, public records 
and resell those very records as a private commodity for a profit.376 
This Part explores how both commercial requesting generally 
and information reselling specifically threaten to undermine the 
FOIA’s democratic purposes. First, FOIA has become a mechanism 
for transferring wealth from the federal government to private 
enterprise and can be more properly conceptualized as an unjustified 
form of corporate subsidy never contemplated, much less endorsed, 
by Congress. Second, commercial interests have overwhelmed FOIA 
offices and their resources to respond to requests. The sheer volume 
of commercial requests likely contributes to the delay and inattention 
often experienced by constituencies at the heart of FOIA’s intended 
use: the press and watchdog groups whose mission is to enhance 
external oversight of governmental activity and promote democratic 
governance. And third, as to information resellers in particular, these 
businesses have become, for many agencies, the true brokers of public 
information, thereby de facto taking over functions thought to be 
inherently governmental. These combined effects, as described below, 
may harm the goal of maximum public transparency for democracy-
enhancing purposes. 
A. Subsidizing “Secrets” 
Corporate subsidies come in a variety of forms. From corporate 
tax breaks377 to bank bailouts378 to farm subsidies,379 government 
 
 376. As documented supra Part II, five of the six studied agencies have commercial 
information resellers among their top requesters.  
 377. For example, state and local governments often offer tax breaks to corporations located 
within the jurisdiction, a practice that is also labeled “tax subsidies.” See Matthew Dolan, Tax-
Subsidy Programs Fuel Budget Deficits, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/corporate-tax-incentives-generate-budget-problems-1423696411 [http://perma.cc/ZB83-
AM9R]. One scholar described how the charitable tax deduction in the Internal Revenue Code 
is, in effect, “a subsidy to the organization to which the donated money has been paid.” 
Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good With the Bad: Recognizing the Negative 
Externalities Created by Charities and Their Implications for the Charitable Deduction, 52 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 977, 979 (2010).  
 378. For example, the International Monetary Fund considers the bank bailouts following 
the 2008 global financial crisis to be a type of subsidy. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MOVING FROM LIQUIDITY- TO GROWTH-DRIVEN MARKETS 
101 (2014), http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2014/01/pdf/c3.pdf [http://perma.cc/
74VX-FF4J]. 
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routinely provides particular benefits to a particular business or group 
of businesses.380 Tax breaks, subsidies in the form of checks written, 
and bailouts, however, are easy to identify, debate, and critique in the 
public discourse. Harder to identify, however, are the many more 
subtle government actions that effectively result in a similar financial 
benefit to certain businesses. As demonstrated by the data collected 
in this study, FOIA is one such area. 
Federal agencies are spending vast resources fulfilling FOIA 
requests submitted by business enterprises—producing information 
whose benefit is largely, if not entirely, captured by a single 
requesting business—and the data shows that they are not recouping 
even a meaningful fraction of those costs.381 The SEC, in FY 2013, had 
twenty-nine full-time FOIA employees and another 1.92 full-time 
equivalents administering FOIA, at a total processing cost of 
$4,013,157.09.382 Commercial requesters comprise 69 percent of all 
requests in 2013.383 Assuming they account for roughly the same 
 
 379. See Milking Taxpayers: As Crop Prices Fall, Farmers Grow Subsidies Instead, THE 
ECONOMIST (Feb. 14, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21643191-crop-
prices-fall-farmers-grow-subsidies-instead-milking-taxpayers [http://perma.cc/YW7B-C8T5] 
(describing how 2300 farms that grew no crops were paid subsidies over a four-year period and 
how subsidies overall cost taxpayers $20 billion annually).  
 380. Subsidies are typically conceived of as a financial contribution to a specific business or 
group of businesses within an industry. See Wentong Zheng, Counting Once, Counting Twice: 
The Precarious State of Subsidy Regulation, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 427, 451–52 (2013) (defining 
subsidy for the purposes of international trade law).  
 381. Moreover, individual instances of misclassification at the federal level may deter or 
prevent some requesters from proceeding. See, e.g., Judge Rejects DHS Classification of 
Syracuse University Research Center as a Commercial Requester, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS 
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (July 2, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/foia/ice/20150702 [http://perma.cc/
R3RD-A2WD]. One public report recently exposed an opposite problem at the state level: state 
agencies often charge such high fees that open records laws are, as a practical matter, 
inaccessible for average citizens and the news media. Michael Felberbaum, Big Fees to View 
Public Documents Discourage Public Access, MCCLATCHY DC (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.
mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/article24781396.html [http://perma.cc/P2GS-4N92].  
 382. U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA): ANNUAL 
REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 14, http://www.sec.gov/foia/arfoia13.pdf [http://perma.cc/
PDV3-VWRC].  
 383. See SEC Data, supra note 108. All agency data concerning the cost of administering 
FOIA is reported by fiscal year, while the data collected for this study is sorted according to 
calendar year. Although of course the time period is overlapping, it is not identical. Both time 
periods cover exactly one year, however, and there is no reason to believe that anything 
aberrant occurred to skew the data in the non-overlapping time period. Nonetheless, these are 
simply estimates of the cost of administering FOIA for commercial users, and thus illustrate, but 
do not precisely define, the subsidy the government provides.  
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proportion the SEC’s FOIA-processing costs,384 commercial 
requesters cost the SEC approximately $2,769,078, even if 
SECProbes.com is properly categorized as a news media requester.385 
If SECProbes.com were deemed a commercial requester, as seems 
most appropriate, 89 percent of SEC requests would receive the 
“commercial” designation, raising the cost to more like $3,571,709.386 
Yet, the SEC collected just $23,492.24 in fees from commercial 
requesters in 2013, an amount that would barely change by adding the 
single fee charged to SECProbes.com that year, for $28.387 Thus, the 
SEC recoups a paltry 0.8 percent of the cost of responding to 
commercial requests, or, if SECProbes.com were included, 0.6 
percent. 
In FY 2013, FDA reported spending a whopping $33,570,981.00 
on FOIA processing, having dedicated eighty-two full-time personnel 
and additional 52.15 full-time equivalents to the task.388 As 
approximately 75 percent of their requests are from commercial 
interests,389 approximately $25 million would be attributable to 
commercial interests. And yet, in 2013, FDA collected a mere 
$327,075 from commercial requesters in fees, representing only a little 
more than 1 percent of the approximate cost to FDA of processing 
commercial FOIA requests.390 In fact, out of 7596 commercial 
requests, FDA fulfilled 3261 (or 43 percent) free of any charge.391 
 
 384. Because agencies do not keep an accounting of costs they incur per request, but rather 
only calculate their total annual FOIA processing costs, it is not possible to ascertain precisely 
what costs are attributable to commercial requesters. Accordingly, in the rough calculations in 
this section, I simply divide the costs based on the proportion of requests that are attributed to 
commercial requesters. It is entirely possible that commercial requests, because they tend to be 
more routine, account for less agency cost on average per request than, say, news media 
requests. However, even if these rough estimates of costs attributable to commercial requesters 
were off by two- or threefold, the point would remain that commercial requesters are not 
charged fees that come close to covering the costs incurred by agencies.  
 385. See id. 
 386. See id.  
 387. See id.  
 388. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ANNUAL REPORT 2013, 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/FOI/FOIAAnnualReports/ucm386584.htm [http://
perma.cc/MTW5-7ZHZ].  
 389. See FDA Data, supra note 155.  
 390. The total amount of fees collected in FY 2013 from all requesters was reported as 
$577,039. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 388. 
 391. FDA Data, supra note 155. Of course, requesters in other categories were charged, on 
average, far less frequently and, when charged, were charged lower dollar amounts. Id. 
(demonstrating that of the 1222 news media requests, only one was charged a fee of $6.25, and 
of the 1330 other requests, 110 were charged a fee, the average of which was $50.98). 
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The EPA, for its part, spent $16,493,258.50 on its FOIA 
processing operations, having employed forty-six full-time FOIA staff 
and just over sixty-eight full-time equivalents to the task.392 With 79 
percent of its requests coming from commercial requesters, that 
would equate to an approximate $13,029,674.22 cost of processing 
commercial requests. Although individualized fee information for 
EPA is not available, only $241,467.10 was collected from all 
requesters.393 Even if all of the fees collected were from commercial 
requesters, the fees would recoup only 1.8 percent of the expense 
incurred. 
DLA, which of course almost exclusively serves commercial 
requesters, at 96 percent of their requests, devoted six full-time FOIA 
staff and eight full-time equivalents to FOIA request processing in 
FY 2013, costing the agency a total of $1,870,202.00.394 Nearly all of 
that cost, roughly $1,739,287, is attributable to commercial requesters, 
but only $71,897.29, or about 4 percent of the cost, was collected from 
commercial requesters.395 Of the 4226 commercial requests, 2337, or 
55 percent, were fulfilled for free.396 Even Day & Day, the biggest 
commercial information reseller, incurred a charge for only seventy-
three of its 224 requests.397 
At FTC in FY 2013, one full-time FOIA employee and 8.54 full-
time equivalents administered FOIA at a total processing cost of 
$658,434.398 Because about 34 percent of the requests are commercial, 
their proportionate share of costs would be roughly $223,867; yet, 
only $27,312.48, or just under 12 percent, was charged for commercial 
requests.399 Although the FTC recouped a significantly larger 
proportion of its costs for processing commercial requests, this is still 
a small fraction of the costs borne by the agency. 
 
 392. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA FOIA ANNUAL REPORT FOR 10/01/2012 THROUGH 
09/30/2013, at 13, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-08/documents/2013report.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/YKQ2-C6RS].  
 393. Id.  
 394. DEP’T OF DEF., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2013, at 60, http://open.defense.gov/Portals/23/Documents/DoDFY2013AnnualFOIA_
Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/RQY8-FQDD].  
 395. DLA Data, supra note 259. 
 396. See id.  
 397. Id.  
 398. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 32, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/foia-report-
fy13/2013r-fo.pdf [http://perma.cc/NS8P-Q4PW].  
 399. FTC Data, supra note 293. 
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And finally, NIH, having employed seventeen full-time FOIA 
staff and an additional 14.31 full-time equivalents working on FOIA 
processing, reported spending $3,336,857.90 on FOIA administration 
in FY 2013.400 Because its commercial requesters are responsible for 
about 36 percent of requests made,401 again, it is safe to assume 
approximately $1.2 million of the costs are attributable to fulfilling 
commercial requests. Yet, in 2013, commercial requesters paid a total 
of $27,669.65 in fees,402 representing just over 2 percent of the 
processing costs associated with their requests. Here, an even higher 
proportion of commercial requesters paid no fee at all: 280 of a total 
436, or 64 percent.403 This was even true of pure information reseller 
the FOIA Group, which incurred a fee for only eleven of its twenty-
five requests.404 
FOIA, these cost figures illustrate, allows corporations to profit 
handsomely from information it obtains from the government for free 
or close to it.405 Even the agency that recoups the most of its expenses 
associated with commercial FOIA request processing, the FTC, 
recoups only about a tenth of the cost. The rest of these agencies are 
collecting between less than 1 and less than 5 percent. All of this in a 
climate in which the federal government dedicated 4213 federal staff 
full-time equivalents to administering FOIA in FY 2013 at an 
 
 400. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS FISCAL YEAR 2013 FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ANNUAL REPORT § IX, http://www.hhs.gov/foia/reports/13anlrpt.html [http://
perma.cc/RCK2-8478]. 
 401. NIH Data, supra note 340.  
 402. Id.  
 403. Id. 
 404. Id.  
 405. Id. The reasons for the discrepancy between the costs incurred by agencies processing 
commercial requests and the fees collected from those requesters are not entirely clear. One 
contributing factor may be FOIA’s own prohibition on charging fees if “the costs of routine 
collection and processing of the fee are likely to equal or exceed the amount of the fee.” 5 
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv)(I) (2012). For example, the SEC will not charge a fee of less than $20 
under this provision. See Freedom of Information Act Regulations: Fee Schedule, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-75388, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,432, 41,433 (July 15, 2015) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 200). If high-volume commercial requesters tend to request discrete items in each 
request, each request may fall below that threshold and result in no charge. Another possibility 
is that search, review, and duplication do not account for all of the time spent processing a 
request. For example, agencies may not (or may not be able to) account for time spent 
communicating with the requester about the status of a request, tracking the processing of the 
request, or drafting a response to a request. Perhaps in other cases it is simply difficult to 
accurately include all of the time spent by personnel on a particular request for logistical 
reasons. These are merely hypotheses. My data does not reveal reasons behind the discrepancy, 
only its existence.  
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estimated cost of $446,792,333.69.406 That is, the federal government 
spent nearly half a billion dollars on FOIA. 
Business subsidies are not, of course, all net losses for the public. 
In fact, the theoretical basis for subsidizing certain business activities 
is that it promotes a public or collective good that would otherwise be 
underprovided and, in that way, the subsidy creates a net efficiency 
gain.407 Under this theory, local governments, for example, often offer 
businesses subsidies to locate in a particular jurisdiction to incentivize 
job creation, urban revitalization, or infrastructure investments.408 In 
fact, providing an incentive to engage in socially desirable behavior is 
a prime goal of subsidies.409 In contrast, other subsidies may be 
rightfully critiqued on the ground that they serve “no recognizable 
social objective.”410 
Under this theory, subsidizing FOIA requesting that promotes 
FOIA’s democracy-enhancing goals makes good sense.411 In 
particular, news media outlets that use FOIA as the basis for 
reporting are using the subsidized government information to create a 
public or collective good of educating a broad audience and 
producing knowledge. Individuals may also use FOIA in a way that 
produces a public good by, for example, requesting records on which 
 
 406. DOJ, FY 2013 SUMMARY, supra note 109, at 19–20. 
 407. Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 
1393, 1396–1406 (1988).  
 408. See, e.g., Justin Wm. Moyer, Tesla ‘Gigafactory’ will go to Sparks, Nev, WASH. POST 
(Sep. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/09/05/tesla-giga
factory-will-go-to-sparks-nev [http://perma.cc/4UPH-K7CJ] (describing the benefits Nevada 
expects to receive for the $1.3 billion in tax breaks it offered to win the bid for the Tesla plant).  
 409. See McCormack, supra note 377, at 984 (discussing this justification with respect to 
individual deductions in the tax code).  
 410. Jeanne Sahadi, The ‘Chicken Poop’ Credit and Other Bad Tax Breaks, CNN MONEY 
(May 24, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/24/news/economy/corporate-tax-breaks [http://
perma.cc/5WBE-QYU7] (describing a federal tax credit for producing electricity using certain 
renewable resources, which, because of the inclusiveness of the definition, is a “total windfall” 
for chicken producers, who can burn chicken poop and claim the credit).  
 411. I do not, as others have in various contexts, make the detailed case that the particular 
costs of the subsidies are justified vis-à-vis the public benefit created, or that the public good 
would not otherwise have been produced, thus squarely fitting within the subsidy theory. See, 
e.g., McCormack, supra note 377, at 979 (closely analyzing the subsidy theory in the context of 
charitable contributions deductions to federal income tax). I mean only to loosely use subsidy 
theory to describe the theoretical differences between FOIA requesting that promotes 
democratic participation and the vast majority of commercial FOIA requesting.  
KWOKA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2016  12:45 AM 
2016] FOIA, INC. 1421 
they rely to later lobby their representatives for policy changes.412 
Democratic participation is itself a sort of collective good. 
The subsidy of providing free or low-cost government records to 
businesses, however, is not justified in the large majority of cases. In 
fact, businesses’ use of the vast majority, if not all, of the records are 
by definition private uses. As demonstrated above, businesses request 
records under FOIA to gain a competitive advantage, perform due 
diligence on their deals, or sell the records to others at a profit. Most 
of the time they can only reap those benefits if the information they 
glean is closely held, not publicized for common use. Rather than 
subsidizing transparency, FOIA’s commercial subsidy has the effect 
of paying for corporate “secrets” discovered using FOIA. 
Information resellers fare even worse under this sort of analysis. 
Subsidizing records to resellers validates a sort of buy-low, sell-high 
arbitrage in federal records at great profit to the reseller, but no 
public or collective benefit in increased access to information. 
Interestingly, the existence of this corporate giveaway has gone 
unnoticed even in public debates about the cost of FOIA to the 
federal government.413 Private entities that use FOIA to obtain 
government information certainly have little interest in highlighting 
this result, so it is no surprise that they do not tout the substantial 
benefit that corporations receive. Journalists and advocates who 
lament FOIA’s current feebleness as a tool for facilitating 
government transparency seem not to have noted this feature of 
corporate requesting.414 Likewise, the members of Congress who 
 
 412. Certainly, other individual uses might produce important public goods as well. For 
example, immigrants in removal proceedings often use FOIA to obtain the government’s 
information on their own case (because no administrative discovery mechanism is in place). 
Although it sought to benefit the particular immigrant, these records arguably produce the 
public good of fairer administrative hearings and more accurate outcomes of immigration 
determinations. See Special FOIA Processing Tack for Individuals Appearing Before an 
Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. 9017, 9017–18 (Feb. 28, 2007) (documenting the frequency of 
such requests by creating a special track for FOIA requests to U.S. Citizen and Immigration 
Services made by individuals appearing before an immigration court); see also Dent v. Holder, 
627 F.3d 365, 374 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that access to the government’s file on an immigrant 
in removal proceedings is a due-process requirement, and describing the need for access in 
order to “fully and fairly” litigate a defense to removal).  
 413. See, e.g., Ensuring Government Transparency Through FOIA Reform: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Gov’t Operations of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Oversight & Reforms, 114th 
Cong. 11 (2015) (statement of Frederick J. Sadler, Former FOIA Officer, Food & Drug 
Admin.) (failing to acknowledge the subsidy that commercial requesters received as a result of 
the low fees they are charged). 
 414. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, Slow Responses Cloud a Window into Washington, NY. 
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/us/slow-freedom-of-information-
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crafted FOIA and pushed it through enactment did not mention this 
cost discrepancy in their deliberations.415 
Although it would be perilous to infer meaning from silence, 
everything that FOIA’s architects did say points to the conclusion 
that they did not envision it as a means of subsidizing corporate 
activity. To them, FOIA was supposed to promote knowledge about 
governmental activities and accountability of government officials. It 
was, at bottom, intended to boost the democratic process by arming 
the citizenry with information about what government is up to. As the 
Supreme Court put it, FOIA’s “basic purpose” is “to hold the 
governors accountable to the governed.”416 Subsidizing private 
corporate activity without public benefit is a far cry from that goal. In 
harnessing FOIA’s low-cost, high-value potential for their own gain, 
commercial requesters perversely have turned the nation’s most 
prominent transparency law into a hidden means of subsidizing 
valuable corporate secrets. 
B. Flooding FOIA Offices 
A second implication of this study’s findings is that commercial 
users may be crowding out more publicly beneficial uses of FOIA 
because of a combination of the sheer volume of commercial 
requesters and the limited resources agencies have to serve all FOIA 
users. Particularly because the news media and other users who serve 
FOIA’s core mission, such as watchdog groups, are often working on 
a short timeline, commercial users may substantially burden the 
overtaxed FOIA response system. 
This research conclusively demonstrates that at some agencies, 
commercial users of FOIA are a dominant presence. At four of the 
six studied agencies, commercial requesters formed the majority—
indeed the vast majority—of all requesters. Most strikingly, they 
 
responses-cloud-a-window-into-washington.html [http://perma.cc/2MQX-N9EV] (discussing 
FOIA delays and the problems they pose for journalists, citing various possible causes but not 
mentioning commercial requesters).  
 415. Senate and House reports as well as floor debates demonstrate that the legislative 
history of FOIA evidences no discussion of how FOIA might operate as a subsidy. See, e.g., 
H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497, at 12 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2429; S. Rep. No. 
1219, at 4 (1964), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/foialeghistory/S.%20Rep.%20No.%2088-
1219%20%281966%20Source%20Book%29.pdf [http://perma.cc/BED7-SYRH]; 112 CONG. 
REC. 13,640, 13,642 (1966).  
 416. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).  
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formed 96 percent of DLA requesters,417 either 69 percent or 89 
percent of SEC requesters (depending on the authenticity of 
SECProbes.com as a news media organization),418 79 percent of EPA 
requesters, and 75 percent of FDA requesters.419 At the SEC, the 
largest commercial requesters were filing literally thousands of 
requests per year,420 and at FDA, EPA, and DLA, the largest 
commercial requesters were filing hundreds.421 
Although it is not possible to quantify the effect on agency 
response times any given requester or group of requesters might 
have, especially in light of agencies’ ongoing efforts to keep up with 
demand for FOIA services, it is all but inevitable that this volume of 
requesters will have an impact. Too often at these same agencies, 
response times not only exceed the law’s twenty-business-day 
requirement, but also exceed any reasonable point of utility for a 
journalist or watchdog group. At FDA, in FY 2014, even for simple 
requests, a tracking designation given by the agency, only 320 of a 
total 6776 were processed within the twenty-business-day deadline.422 
In fact, 1830 of those requests took longer than 200 days to process.423 
For complex requests the situation was worse: the average processing 
time was 138 days.424 Although the SEC is faring better, perhaps 
because it apparently receives very few complex requests, in FY 2014 
it still failed to meet the twenty-business-day deadline to respond to 
2332 of its 14,754 requests, and took longer than 100 days to respond 
to 243 of them.425 Although EPA performed well on its simple 
requests (which were less than half of its requests), for complex 
requests the agency’s median response time was thirty-three days and 
 
 417. DLA Data, supra note 259. 
 418. SEC Data, supra note 108.  
 419. FDA Data, supra note 155.  
 420. See SEC Data, supra note 108.  
 421. See DLA Data, supra note 259; FDA Data, supra note 155.  
 422. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS FISCAL YEAR 2014 FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ANNUAL REPORT § VII.C.1, http://www.hhs.gov/foia/reports/14anlrpt.html 
[http://perma.cc/VM6X-GG2B]. 
 423. Id.  
 424. Id.  
 425. U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N , FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) ANNUAL 
REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 12, http://www.sec.gov/foia/arfoia14.pdf [http://perma.cc/
5CHS-D2QG]. 
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its longest response time was a staggering 2120 days.426 Similarly, 
DLA performed well on its simple requests, but still failed in FY 2014 
to meet the deadline for 161 of its 488 complex requests.427 
As previously documented, delay and administrative burden are 
some of the most commonly cited reasons why journalists do not 
make more use of FOIA.428 And the level of service provided by 
access professionals has been a matter of concern reaching the level 
of congressional action.429 The sheer volume of commercial requests 
at some agencies is by definition taxing the system, and can only be 
making the barriers to the use of FOIA for democracy-enhancing 
activities all the higher. 
C. Reselling Public Records Access 
The commercial requesters who use FOIA solely or primarily to 
engage in information reselling present an additional troubling 
implication: these requesters in essence represent a de facto 
outsourcing of transparency and public records services. Although 
agencies sometimes do formally contract with private companies to 
provide FOIA processing services, those companies merely help 
agencies respond to FOIA requests, and the final response comes 
from the agency itself.430 With information resellers, the reseller, 
having already requested and received federal records under FOIA, 
unilaterally undertakes to sell those records at a profit on the private 
market. As the data reported in this research demonstrates, these for-
profit businesses have become the actual locus for interested parties 
to obtain government records at some agencies, a sort of de facto 
outsourcing of a vital public function. 
Information resellers, rather than those who use public records 
as part of a value-added consulting or advising service, include the 
primary activities of entities described above such as Bioscience 
 
 426. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA FOIA ANNUAL REPORT FOR 10/01/2013 
THROUGH 09/30/2014, at 9, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-03/documents/2014_
annual_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/W96E-8APX].  
 427. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2014, at 48, http://open.defense.gov/Portals/23/Documents/DoDFY2014AnnualFOIA_
Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/M29R-GSEQ]. 
 428. See supra notes 73–89 and accompanying text.  
 429. See, e.g., OPEN Government Act of 2007, S. 2488, 110th Cong. § 10 (2007) (requiring 
each agency, for the first time, to have a Public Liaison to improve communications with 
requesters).  
 430. See infra note 442 and accompanying text. 
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Advisors,431 Day & Day,432 EDR, Inc.,433 FOI Services Inc.,434 the FOIA 
Group,435 RoyaltyStat LLC,436 and Washington Information Source.437 
As this research shows, pure information resellers are not limited to a 
single agency or industry, but rather have cropped up in a variety of 
contexts—they are present as top requesters at five of the six studied 
agencies.438 In fact, FDA and SEC evidence multiple substantial-
volume requesters of this nature who are evidently competing against 
one another.439 
To be sure, the fact that the products sold are simply copies of 
raw government records does not mean that these companies do not 
add value; that is, in fact, what makes their services attractive and 
profitable. For those records that are contained in resellers’ 
databases, the access provided to third-party paying clients is 
instantaneous, an obvious advantage over using FOIA itself. For 
those records that are custom requested on behalf of a paying client, 
anonymity is a key advantage—the interested party never has to 
make its identity known by submitting a request in its own name.440 In 
either case, the clients are also essentially paying for the resellers’ 
time and effort in obtaining the records, including drafting and filing 
the request, any back and forth of communication with the agency, 
and any negotiation over withholdings or appeal. 
But no matter the benefits to the third parties of using a reselling 
service rather than requesting records under FOIA as an initial 
matter, the fact is that the reseller becomes the information broker. 
The records the reseller decides should be requested dictate what is 
 
 431. See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text. 
 432. See supra notes 262–75 and accompanying text.  
 433. See supra notes 241–47 and accompanying text. 
 434. See supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text. 
 435. See supra notes 343–53 and accompanying text. 
 436. See supra notes 139–44 and accompanying text. 
 437. See supra notes 172–87 and accompanying text. 
 438. See supra Parts II.A–C, II.E.  
 439. See supra Parts II.A–B.  
 440. This is an advantage that is advertised by custom requesting services. See, e.g., 
Document Retrieval, FOI SERVICES INC., http://www.foiservices.com/brochure/docretrieval.cfm 
[http://perma.cc/FCU5-MAVY] (“Of course, we hold every inquiry confidential. Every request 
submitted to the government carries the FOI name . . . so no one knows the products, processes, 
and companies you’re researching.”); FOIA Services, FOIA GROUP INC., http://www.foia.com/
foia.aspx [http://perma.cc/QT2S-67G7] (“The identity of our client is never revealed to any 
government agency, contractor or other entity.”). A senior vice president of FOI Services Inc. 
said that a “huge, huge reason people use our firm is to blind their requests.” Mullins & Weaver, 
supra note 99.  
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maintained in its database. The records the reseller decides are worth 
fighting for with the agency if the agency resists disclosure are those 
that will be available. And the records the reseller decides it no 
longer can economically pursue will remain locked in government 
filing cabinets. Because information resellers occupy a substantial 
piece of the FOIA universe, they hold a great deal of power over 
what becomes, as a practical matter, available. Transparency in 
pursuit of democracy has been outsourced. 
Limits on formal government contracting provide guideposts by 
which to measure the de facto outsourcing that occurs in this context. 
The OMB’s Circular A-76 prohibits the outsourcing of “inherently 
governmental activities,” which are activities that involve the 
“exercise of substantial discretion in applying government 
authority.”441 In fact, for agencies that have formally contracted for 
FOIA processing services, they are careful to vest in a government 
employee the final decision concerning which records will be 
released, thus illustrating the discretionary authority inherent 
therein.442 This standard, and the government’s treatment of it in the 
FOIA context, illustrates the dangers of the de facto outsourcing that 
occurs when cottage industries of resellers emerge.443 Making 
government information available is, and has been treated in the 
contracting context as, an inherently public function. Although the 
outsourcing standards do not actually govern information resellers 
because the government has not formally outsourced FOIA services 
to these companies, the standards are a useful analogue to 
understanding the dangers of de facto outsourcing in this area. 
 
 441. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR 
NO. A-76, PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (2003), at 4(b), Attachment A B(1)(a), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a076_a76_incl_tech_correction [https://perma.cc/AW
C8-W9Q3]. See generally Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of 
Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397 (2006) (describing the various sources of limits on 
outsourcing, and delimiting the inherent government functions test). 
 442. Lee, supra note 353.  
 443. This is not to diminish a distinct, but related, transparency problem that occurs as a 
result of outsourcing: when contractors providing government services themselves are exempt 
from transparency laws, thereby decreasing accountability in whole sectors of government 
activity. See generally Sarah Shik Lamdan, Sunshine for Sale: Environmental Contractors and the 
Freedom of Information Act, 15 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 228 (2014) (documenting the transparency-
inhibiting effects of the proliferation of environmental government contractors).  
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IV.  RECLAIMING INFORMATION DEMOCRACY 
Commercial requesting has distorted the administration of 
transparency laws at many federal agencies such that FOIA fails to 
effectively serve the public good as intended and instead fuels and 
subsidizes profit-driven business models that decrease public 
accountability. This Part turns to the imbalance between FOIA’s 
democratic aspirations and its corporate reality by proposing 
remedies policymakers might adopt to realize FOIA’s “vital” role in 
American governance.444 
One legislative response might be to place restrictions or burdens 
on the commercial use of FOIA. For instance, it is tempting to 
consider disallowing FOIA requests made for certain purposes (such 
as pure resale).445 Such a prohibition, however, would be unworkable. 
Businesses could simply have individuals who are members of their 
staff send FOIA requests without naming the business. Individual 
entrepreneurs could enlist friends and family to do the same. 
Deciphering true individual requesters from these individuals who 
may be requesting on behalf of someone else would be next to 
impossible.446 Moreover, it may simply lead to a return to the pre-
 
 444. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).  
 445. Professor James O’Reilly has at least suggested, without specifics, a similar approach, 
criticizing the idea that “motives [are] only rarely discussed in [FOIA] cases” even as to 
“requests from commercial competitors,” whose motives are “officially disregarded.” O’Reilly, 
supra note 70, at 568 (focusing mainly on potential national-security threats, rather than 
commercial requesting).  
 446. As an illustration of the difficulty, consider the now-famous res judicata case Taylor v. 
Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). There, Greg Herrick, an antique aircraft enthusiast who was 
restoring his vintage airplane, requested certain specifications for the plane on file with the 
Federal Aviation Administration. Id. at 885–86. When he was denied access to the information 
under FOIA, he sued and lost before the Tenth Circuit. Id. at 887. Later, Brent Taylor filed a 
FOIA request for the same information and was denied, but when he sued, the D.C. Circuit 
precluded his claim as barred by the doctrine of “virtual representation.” Id. at 889. The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding res judicata would only bar the suit if Taylor actually 
represented Herrick in filing the request and maintaining the lawsuit. Id. at 906. Even though 
Taylor and Herrick were friends, were represented by the same lawyer, Taylor was president of 
an antique aircraft association to which Herrick belonged, Taylor had agreed to help Herrick 
restore his plane, and the two shared documents Herrick obtained in discovery in the second 
suit for use in the first suit, id. at 889, on remand before the district court the government 
conceded it could not and would not attempt to demonstrate that Taylor actually represented or 
was in privity with Herrick, see Taylor v. Babbitt, 673 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 n.1 (2009) (noting that 
the government has represented it “will not pursue the claim preclusion issue” on remand). If 
the association between Taylor and Herrick is not enough to suggest Taylor may have been or 
was acting on Herrick’s behalf, no federal agency will ever be able to conclusively determine 
that one person has submitted a FOIA request on another’s behalf, and certainly not in an 
informal administrative proceeding such as merely responding to a FOIA request. 
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FOIA APA disclosure provision, which required the public to justify 
a request for government information, a provision that became 
known not as a disclosure statute, but a “withholding statute,” for its 
failure to effectively allow public access to records.447 
A more modest approach would be to increase the fees charged 
to commercial requesters in the hopes either of fully compensating 
the federal government for the cost of processing their requests or of 
discouraging some amount of commercial requesting. Although 
increasing fees may be a part of the solution, any increase that only 
applied to commercial requesters and which was significant enough to 
make up for the current shortfall in cost recoupment would likely 
encourage commercial requesters to use individuals as their proxies in 
FOIA requesting, as described above.448 If the cost increase to 
commercial requesters were more modest, it would fail to fully 
effectuate its goal. One recent proposal by Lawrence Tai would 
increase all fees charged for FOIA administration, albeit with greater 
increases for commercial requesters.449 Increasing fees for individuals 
might, as Tai suggests, weed out individual requests that do not have 
value to the public in understanding the operations of government,450 
but it would also likely prove to be a barrier to many individuals who 
use FOIA to serve information needs not met in any other way. For 
instance, the Department of Homeland Security receives tens of 
thousands of FOIA requests a year from noncitizens in removal 
proceedings who are simply seeking their own immigration file, 
relying on FOIA only because there is no right of administrative 
discovery in immigration court.451 Without somehow handling these 
legitimate individual-information needs in a way that would not be 
cost prohibitive to already-disadvantaged groups, raising FOIA fees 
on individual requesters is ill-advised. 
 
 447. S. REP. NO. 88-1219, at 8, 10. The original APA provision read, “Save as otherwise 
required by statute, matters of official record shall in accordance with published rule be made 
available to persons properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for 
good cause found.” Id. at 10.  
 448. See supra note 441 and accompanying text. 
 449. Laurence Tai, Fast Fixes for FOIA, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 455, 483–88 (2015). Tai 
would pair this fee increase at the administrative level with increased availability of attorneys’ 
fees awards to prevailing plaintiffs in litigation. Id. at 488–90. 
 450. Id.  
 451. See supra note 412. The Ninth Circuit stands as the one exception to the general rule 
that immigration court proceedings lack an administrative discovery mechanism. See Dent v. 
Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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No single solution perfectly solves the problems described above 
that are posed by the current state of commercial FOIA requesting 
practices. Targeted, strategic affirmative disclosure, however, 
provides one of the most promising avenues for alleviating the 
privatization of FOIA and returning public information to its 
anticipated democratic use. 
A. Affirmative Disclosure 
FOIA only requires the most minimal amount of affirmative or 
proactive agency disclosure; yet affirmative disclosure is largely 
viewed as the way of the future.452 President Obama, in his first day in 
office, issued a transparency memorandum that announced that 
“[t]he presumption of disclosure also means that agencies should take 
affirmative steps to make information public. They should not wait 
for specific requests from the public.”453 Especially in light of 
technological advances, affirmative disclosure holds the key to unlock 
true government transparency. 
From its inception, FOIA has required some amount of 
affirmative disclosure. First, it required the affirmative publication of 
agency rules and regulations in the Federal Register, and second, it 
required final agency orders in adjudications, among limited other 
materials, to be made “available” even absent a request.454 This, 
however, essentially required affirmative disclosure of agency “law,” 
not “government information.”455 In 1996, Congress passed the E-
FOIA amendments which, among other things, required internet 
publication of requested records that “because of the nature of their 
subject matter, the agency determines have become or are likely to 
become the subject of subsequent requests for substantially the same 
records.”456 
 
 452. See David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of 
Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1792–93 (2008) (contending that the 
“request-and-wait-for-a-response approach designed for paper records” is obsolete, and calling 
for more affirmative disclosure obligations). See generally Michael Herz, Law Lags Behind: 
FOIA and Affirmative Disclosure of Information, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 577 
(2009) (advocating for affirmative disclosure in FOIA). 
 453. Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from President 
Barack Obama, Freedom of Information Act (Jan. 21, 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the_
press_office/Freedom_of_Information_Act [https://perma.cc/JKS4-6YXG]. 
 454. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1), (a)(2) (2012).  
 455. Herz, supra note 452, at 586. 
 456. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D) (2012).  
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The success of the E-FOIA provisions, however, has been 
generally regarded as extremely limited because of agencies’ 
implementation failures.457 Even those agencies that have regularly 
posted frequently requested records online—or even all records 
released under FOIA458—have generally done so in ways that remain 
hard for the public to search for and locate records they might want.459 
Accordingly, the public still views the request-and-response model as 
the centerpiece of FOIA. 
Although affirmative disclosure initiatives have not fulfilled their 
promise thus far, commercial requesting provides an area ripe for 
targeted affirmative disclosure because, as this study demonstrates, 
commercial requesting, by and large, is a formulaic enterprise. The 
request-and-response model may well be a very good model for 
handling individualized requests for information. But it makes less 
sense when considering requests for information that essentially 
reproduce an index of all of the agency’s records of a particular type. 
Companies ask for the same types of records (and sometimes the very 
same records themselves) over and over again. That is, they are 
looking for individualized records that the agency creates or 
maintains as a matter of routine; things such as inspection reports,460 
contract bids,461 warning letters,462 and grant awards.463 This is 
particularly true for information resellers who are populating 
databases full of a single type of easily identifiable agency-held 
record.464 
For example, at DLA, commercial requesters uniformly asked 
for contracts, bids, and bid abstracts for a particular contract 
 
 457. Herz, supra note 452, at 590–91.  
 458. For example, some agencies are using the “FOIA Online” system, including, relevant 
to this study, the EPA. See FOIA ONLINE, https://foiaonline.regulations.gov/foia/action/public/
home [http://perma.cc/ZZ7K-MYB7]; see also Lisa Rein, White House to Make Public Records 
More Public, WASH. POST (July 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/
wp/2015/07/10/white-house-to-make-public-records-more-public [http://perma.cc/ZTM7-VD
AB] (describing initiatives to encourage more agencies to use the system).  
 459. Tai, supra note 449, at 462–64. 
 460. See supra Part II.B (describing the many high-volume commercial requesters who 
request almost entirely facilities inspection reports from the FDA).  
 461. See supra Part II.C (describing how nearly all commercial requesters—who constitute 
nearly all requesters—at the DLA are requesting such material).  
 462. See supra Part II.A (describing the activities of John Gavin at his various enterprises 
requesting SEC investigative materials).  
 463. See supra Part II.E. (describing the requesting activities of commercial users at NIH).  
 464. See, e.g., supra notes 165–71 and accompanying text (describing FDA News’s database, 
483sonline, which consists entirely of facilities inspection reports from the FDA).  
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number.465 By contrast, the DLA news media requests were more 
varied. Rather than only requesting contract information by contract 
number, they also requested maintenance and malfunction reports on 
particular products,466 information about debarment cases 
(disqualification from contracting),467 information about an 
investigation,468 sales information,469 information about the impact of 
sequestration,470 and FOIA logs,471 among other topics.472 Just by 
examining their own FOIA logs, agencies could readily find 
categories of these repeatedly requested records and, for those 
categories, could create their own online database affirmatively, 
rather than responding to individual requests. 
This type of affirmative disclosure has several benefits over the 
past models. First, disclosure of repeatedly requested records would 
not affect agency deliberations about whether a particular document 
or type of document ought to be released. Using their existing 
expertise and discretion, FOIA officers would decide whether to 
release once and subsequent disclosures would operate automatically. 
It takes the guesswork out of the staff’s decisionmaking about 
whether something needs to be published or not. Second, if agencies 
made a policy decision to publish a certain type of record, 
disseminating could easily be made into a mundane, inexpensive task. 
It would be easy, for example, to build into the process of, say, 
producing an inspection report, uploading it to an extant database. 
Third, if agencies create databases confined to a single category of 
records, it will be far easier to make those databases sensible, 
searchable, and user-friendly. One of the difficult aspects of the 
existing databases of all responses to all FOIA requests is that the 
requests and responses are so varied it is hard for the agencies even to 
find and create relevant search terms or fields.473 And finally, the 
agency does not need to make a determination that a particular 
record is likely to be requested again, only a determination that it 
receives a high volume of requests for records within a given 
 
 465. DLA Data, supra note 259. 
 466. Id. at Request Number HQ DLA-14-HFOI-00025. 
 467. Id. at Request Number HQ DLA-13-HFOI-00060. 
 468. Id. at Request Number HQ DLA-14-HFOI-00008. 
 469. Id. at Request Number DSCP-13-PFOI-00352. 
 470. Id. at Request Number HQ DLA-13-HFOI-00178. 
 471. Id. at Request Number HQ DLA-14-HFOI-00039. 
 472. DLA Data, supra note 259. 
 473. See, e.g., FOIA ONLINE, supra note 458.  
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category. At any given agency, as illustrated below,474 it is often easy 
to identify promising starting points for this sort of affirmative 
disclosure model. 
Affirmative disclosure alleviates, without completely solving, the 
various problems posed by the current corporate FOIA practices. As 
a preliminary matter, it is likely to save agencies money. In fact, 
almost nothing they could do could possibly be as expensive as 
responding to FOIA requests on a one-off basis when companies are 
submitting them by the thousands. Some past empirical evidence 
suggests that affirmative disclosure in other contexts saves agencies 
time and money.475 Given that hundreds of requests are submitted for 
very similar records each year, at the very least the money saved by 
diminished FOIA processing costs should free up resources for 
affirmative disclosure. Moreover, at agencies where commercial 
requesters are not only requesting largely the same kinds of records 
on a repeated basis but are also requesting the agencies’ FOIA logs 
on a regular basis, publication of the FOIA logs should be an 
immediate and easy target for affirmative disclosure. Without doing 
so, requesting the agencies’ FOIA logs piecemeal becomes itself a 
source of FOIA processing costs (and in fact adds to those very logs). 
Cost savings to the agency and freeing up FOIA processing 
resources is not just a benefit to the public fisc. It also creates the 
room for FOIA processing to better serve the public interests for 
which it was intended. If the news media’s primary complaint about 
FOIA is the long wait to receive a response, more resources 
dedicated to the requests that do fall within FOIA’s primary intended 
use will surely ameliorate that burden. 
In addition to alleviating agency resource constraints, affirmative 
disclosure of highly targeted information would remove the profit 
potential of mere information reselling, keep the public function of 
government transparency public, and allow for equal access to the 
records at issue. Researchers may find previously unimagined uses for 
this data to produce public knowledge or insights into government 
activity.476 Instead of subsidizing a particular business or group of 
 
 474. See supra Part IV.B. 
 475. Lauren Harper, Sunshine Week Column: Posting FOIA Releases Online Saves Agencies 
Time and Money, THE SENTINEL: OPINION (Mar. 15, 2015), http://cumberlink.com/news/
opinion/columnists/guest/sunshine-week-column-posting-foia-releases-online-saves-agencies-
time/article_35b8fd5b-a61a-5852-a7a1-dd07da0ca71c.html [http://perma.cc/M2J9-H7CB]. 
 476. For a compelling argument for public databases of source material for researchers, 
albeit in a very different context, see generally Raizel Liebler & June Liebert, Something Rotten 
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businesses by providing free or low-cost government records of value, 
publishing information for equal use by all is consistent with the 
government’s other publication activities that is useful to private 
businesses but also to others.477 In short, it ensures that public 
resources remain public, rather than becoming the product to be sold 
for private gain. 
Moreover, affirmative disclosure may benefit the private market 
as well. For instance, small businesses or market entrants may not 
have the resources or the savvy to access the for-profit information 
reseller services, and thus may be at a competitive disadvantage. 
Making sure that the entire market has access to the same 
information could foster fairer competition. 
To be sure, commercial requesting would remain. Not all records 
would be encompassed within an affirmative disclosure model. In 
addition, even as to the records that are subject to the new affirmative 
disclosure model, businesses will find a way to use that information 
for profitable ventures, including value-added services such as 
advising, indexing, interpreting, and otherwise using the records to 
serve clients’ needs. Those uses, however, use expertise to add value, 
rather than merely taking public records and transforming them into 
a private commodity. In this way, an affirmative disclosure model 
holds great promise in democratizing information access. 
B. Implementing Publication 
Although affirmative disclosure is an attractive option in theory, 
operationalizing it effectively is crucial to its success in abating the 
negative externalities of commercial requesting. The necessary 
predicate to such a proposal is identifying the categories of records at 
each agency that represent low-hanging fruit for government 
published databases. 
Take, for example, the DLA. There, commercial requests 
overwhelmingly list a solicitation number for a contract and requests 
bids or bid abstracts related to that solicitation or awarded contract.478 
Of 3725 requests for records related to a particular solicitation 
 
in the State of Legal Citation: The Life Span of a United States Supreme Court Citation 
Containing an Internet Link (1996-2010), 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 273 (2013).  
 477. For example, the Census Bureau regularly publishes data, research, and reports for use 
by private industry, researchers, and the public alike. See Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/data.html [http://perma.cc/4Q8W-L3GG]; Publications, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/library/publications.html [http://perma.cc/4CDL-TZGJ].  
 478. DLA Data, supra note 259. 
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number that were fully processed, 2752, or 74 percent, were granted 
in full, and all but two of the remaining requests were granted in 
part.479 Thus, the vast majority of the requested records are releasable 
to the public. Moreover, DLA already has an online contract-bid 
system that indexes solicitations and accepts bids, but does not 
affirmatively publish the bids and bid abstracts that are requested by 
the thousands under FOIA.480 Affirmatively publishing these 
frequently requested records—as part of this database or another 
searchable, indexed, downloadable form—would greatly reduce the 
burden on the FOIA office and would make these public records 
truly public, rather than hidden behind the thousand-dollar-a-year 
paywall of Day & Day’s database.481 
The FDA’s FOIA logs show equally promising areas for 
affirmative disclosure. First, the FDA’s facilities inspection reports, 
known as Form 483s, are the subject of multiple resellers’ private 
databases,482 and also the most frequently requested type of record 
under FOIA by commercial requesters.483 Out of the 1978 inspection 
report requests that were fully processed in 2013, 1836, or 93 percent, 
were granted in full, thereby demonstrating that the vast majority of 
such records can be routinely released.484 In fact, one transparency 
advocacy organization has identified these very records as ones that 
“could easily be posted up online with proper redactions,” which 
would “help to level the playing field between investment companies 
and the public.”485 FDA is also an agency where there are voluminous 
 
 479. Id. (counting only those requests with a subject line that included an alphanumeric 
code beginning with “SP”). Again, this number does not include the requests that were closed 
for other reasons, including, the agency not having any responsive records, the request being 
withdrawn, the records not being reasonably described, the request being misdirected, or the 
agency being unable to contact the requester for further information. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra 
note 427, at 22–23. 
 480. DLA Internet Bid Board System (DIBBS), DEF. LOGISTICS AGENCY, https://www.
dibbs.bsm.dla.mil [http://perma.cc/WX5U-LZF7].  
 481. See supra notes 262–75 and accompanying text. 
 482. See, e.g., supra note 163 and accompanying text; About Washington Information Source, 
supra note 172. 
 483. FDA Data, supra note 155.  
 484. Id. This sum does not include requests for inspection reports that were closed for 
reasons other than having reached a substantive determination, including being a duplicate 
request, not being a proper FOIA request, refusal to pay a fee, and, most commonly, there 
being no responsive records to produce. See id. 
 485. Ginger McCall, How to Actually Improve Public Access to Government Documents 
(Under the FOIA), SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Oct. 1, 2013), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/
10/01/how-to-actually-improve-public-access-to-government-documents-under-the-foia [http://
perma.cc/DW8N-7PED]; see also Joel Gurin, Making FOIA More Free and Open, 
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requests for FOIA logs, making it a prime target for existing 
initiatives around publication of all FOIA requests and responsive 
material.486 
To be sure, agencies would need to periodically reevaluate their 
FOIA logs to address new categories of information that became the 
subject matter of repeated FOIA requests. The success of any sort of 
initiative along these lines would depend on agencies’ willingness to 
adjust their approach and exhibit nimbleness in the face of changing 
demands. Moreover, although this section describes a few easy targets 
of affirmative disclosure, it certainly does not do the hard work of 
deciding where to draw the line. Should a database be created if the 
type of record in it is requested one thousand times a year? One 
hundred? Ten? What constitutes the sort of record that should be 
deemed sufficiently similar as to be contained in one database? What 
happens when an agency has created so many databases that it 
becomes hard to identify the correct one in which to search? 
Although not attempting to downplay the importance of those issues, 
this Article advocates for starting somewhere, and addressing each of 
those questions as they arise while recognizing the full range of costs 
and benefits that this research demonstrates are associated with 
commercial FOIA requesting. 
The impetus for this sort of change could originate from a variety 
of places. For example, agencies could recognize the potential cost 
savings and public benefits of affirmative disclosure, and could 
voluntarily undertake this sort of approach. Or, executive branch 
oversight bodies could nudge, encourage, or even mandate it. Such 
initiatives could come from the Department of Justice’s Office of 
Information Policy, which issues policy guidance on FOIA and 
government transparency to all agencies.487 It could also come from 
the relatively new Office of Government Information Services, the 
federal FOIA ombudsman, which reviews FOIA implementation and 
 
OPENDATANOW.COM, http://www.opendatanow.com/2013/09/new-making-foia-more-free-and-
open/#.Vbk717d4omE [http://perma.cc/G5G9-8NGX] (quoting Miriam Nisbet, Director of the 
Office of Government Information Services, concerning the new initiatives). 
 486. See supra notes 169, 199–205 and accompanying text.  
 487. About the Office, OFFICE OF INFO. POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.
gov/oip/about-office [http://perma.cc/5LFC-K4DV] (“The Office of Information Policy (OIP) is 
responsible for encouraging agency compliance with the [FOIA] and for ensuring that the 
President’s FOIA Memorandum and the Attorney General’s FOIA Guidelines are fully 
implemented across the government. OIP develops and issues policy guidance to all agencies on 
proper implementation of the FOIA.”). 
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issues advice to agencies and best practices.488 Technological 
innovations could stem from the Office of E-Government & 
Information Technology, whose mission is to “develop[] and 
provide[] direction in the use of Internet-based technologies to make 
it easier for citizens and businesses to interact with the Federal 
Government, save taxpayer dollars, and streamline citizen 
participation.”489 Or a mandate could come from the President in the 
form of an Executive Order, or, at his or her direction, from the 
OMB, which issues instructions to federal agencies, often in the form 
of OMB Circulars.490 Any of these bodies could recommend, and 
some of them could require, agencies to examine FOIA logs and to 
propose affirmative disclosure goals. OMB could even undertake 
review of such agency plans. And of course, Congress could 
undertake to draft legislation to that effect.491 
CONCLUSION 
The commercial use of FOIA is neither improper nor necessarily 
undesirable. Research reveals, however, that the current quantity and 
character of commercial FOIA requesting, at least at some agencies, 
produces negative externalities that affect how FOIA operates and 
whether it achieves its prime objective: informing the electorate about 
the activities of government so as to hold the governors accountable 
to the governed. In particular, this research documents a surprisingly 
 
 488. OFFICE OF GOV’T INFO. SERVS., https://ogis.archives.gov [https://perma.cc/R8AC-
AZXK] (“Congress has charged us with reviewing FOIA policies, procedures and compliance 
of Federal agencies and to recommend changes to FOIA based on what we see.”). 
 489. Office of E-Government & Information Technology, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/e-gov [http://perma.cc/E4NE-KPHW]. 
 490. Circulars, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_
default [https://perma.cc/QEE9-6LG7] (describing as one purpose of OMB circulars to give 
instructions to federal agencies).  
 491. I recognize the difficulty of coming up with one-size-fits-all rules in this regard, which is 
why I begin with suggestions at the regulatory oversight level where individual plans could be 
tailored to the agency. However, if Congress did want to act, it could start by requiring 
publication of FOIA logs and certain reporting about frequently requested records. It could also 
require every agency to start by identifying one or two candidates for affirmative disclosure. 
Admittedly, this sort of approach with President Obama’s data.gov initiative proved lackluster. 
See DATA.GOV, http://www.data.gov [http://perma.cc/X2R3-VUBU]; Ellen Miller, 
Improvements Needed for High Value Datasets on Data.gov, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Feb. 3, 2010), 
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2010/02/03/improvements-needed-for-high-value-datasets-
on-data-gov [http://perma.cc/77CQ-C5YU] (noting that agencies’ efforts to self-identify the 
highest-value datasets to publish often fell short). Nonetheless, any effort in this regard may 
realize some benefits.  
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large subset of commercial requesters whose primary product for sale 
is public records obtained under FOIA. Rather than allow this de 
facto outsourcing, and in kind subsidization of various types of 
commercial enterprises without corresponding public benefit, 
agencies should meet commercial needs for information head on. 
They should identify those sets of records businesses find valuable 
and publish them for all to use equally, freeing up resources in FOIA 
offices that may be better spent on other types of requests. In this 
way, FOIA can be reclaimed as a democratic tool. 
 
